Tag: Taliban

Hamid Khazi International Airport reopening soon under new management

All Aboard the Oriental Express

Turkey had signaled that it wished to remain in Afghanistan, to provide security at the Hamid Khazi International airport, ‘HKIA’ for the Ashrif Ghani regime, after the US said it was time to go. Now it seems set to, after the Taliban’s victory.

Turkey is a bell weather of the emerging Eurasian alliance. Historically a rival of Russia, it appears it was the attempted July 2016 coup and Erdogan’s belief that it was orchestrated by the Israeli’s, with the tacit backing of the US, that pushed him into the Russian orbit. Southstream, the Russia-Europe gas pipeline which was to be via Orthodox Bulgaria but was scuppered by the EU in 2015, became Turkstream in December 2016.

Patriot missiles were now of no use to Erdogan, as beyond the US being capable of switching them of, any US planes have built in counter measures to US missiles. Turkey is in the process of buying its second tranche of s400 systems and as the price of the s400’s was being booted out of the F35 program, it is clear its military think that s400 bracketing defeats stealth. They will have noticed that the Israelis have not chanced their arm with a F35 within Syria and all their attacks, since the Russians upgraded Syrian air defences, have been stand-off.

For the new Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, having the Turks and Qatari’s run HKIA makes a lot of sense. A new and revolutionary government has a lot to do. More importantly, Turkey has its ambitions. Bringing it in as a key player in the emerging regional coalition, greatly strengthens the new block and there is no doubt Moscow has given the nod.

seems to have questioned the slaughter of the faithful. This appears to have been the reason for their dramatic falling out with the House of Saud. This shift aligns with the Taliban’s apparent move away from sectarianism. More tolerant Pakistan’s role in all this is unknown, but it is probably significant. Without Pakistan, it is doubtful the Taliban could have survived. Pakistan has the second largest Muslim population in the world and importantly a Shia majority in the strategic Gilgit region. Sunni Qatar co-operates with Shia Iran on their shared gas fields and may end up being an outpost of the emerging block.

With Qatar onboard, a Dubai vs Doha rivalry also raises its head. The UAE had been running HKIA. Along with Turkey it was one of the few Muslim countries to send troops to Afghanistan and it does not have the excuse that it was part of NATO. Although Turkey committed many more troops, with a casualty rate of .35% they seem to have been kept out of much combat. We will probably never know how much, if anything, the new Emirate will give the UAE to break the contract with the old regime, but one thing is sure, saving face costs money.

There is an economic dimension, as always. The US and Europe monopolise long haul aircraft manufacture. This makes regional centres all the more important for Russia and China, with their short-haul fleets. With a population of 4 million, Kabul is a region centre, although it is rivalled by the comparative and nearby Islamabad metropolitan area.  

Despite attempts to sanction it, the Russian MC-21 was the showpiece at the 2019 MAKS air show.  Tellingly, the air show was formally opened by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. With a range of 3,730 miles, from Kabul it can reach Moscow and Beijing together with London and Jakarta, at a squeeze. It is scheduled to be certified by the end of 2121 and deliveries are planned for 2022.

Dubai International is currently the second busiest airport after Schiphol, with many passing from India and Pakistan. Its targeted 28 million passengers this year could take a hit if the faithful fly Turk or Qatari. In both Qatar and Turkey, being fidel defensor is important. Qatar is the main financial contributor to Gaza and the Flotilla sailed from Turkey. This does not go unnoticed. With a new regional Muslim block emerging, aligned with Russia and China, UAE’s treaty with Israel may cost it some business.

Finger-pointing in the “Tournament of Shadows”

Amongst the rash of finger pointing following the withdrawal of NATO+ forces from Afghanistan, there has been references to various “prescient” US intelligence analyses, the conclusions generally being drawn that the upper echelons simply ignored them. It may not be that simple.

There are fascinating aspects of the Politburo Minutes from the time of the Soviet engagement. One is the dramatic changes of opinion rapidly sweeping through the Soviet leadership. In the Minute of 17 March 1979 there is a clear consensus. Gromyko states: “under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan.” Andropov reiterates this. Kosygin says, “All of us agree – we must not surrender Afghanistan.” They agree to provision of bread and paying more for Afghani gas. They put in place a rapid army deployment plan and send in specialist military advisors. Kosygin is to speak to the Afghan leader, Taraki and evaluate.

The next day, 18 March 1978, the meeting begins with Kosygin updating following his discussion with Taraki. The news is bleak. Afghani troops are fraternising with the insurgents in Herat and Taraki’s advice is that “If Herat falls, then it is considered that the matter is finished”. There are no troops that could be sent in and they have no tank crews. Taraki has a hair- brained idea that the Russians can send in Tadhzik tank crews in Afghan uniforms, which Kosygin shoots down as sure to be “immediately uncovered” and “broadcast to the whole world”. Kosygin then relates: “Almost without realizing it, Comrade Taraki responded that almost nobody does support the government.” Andropov then characterises the Afghan situation as not ready for socialism and says: “we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, and for us that is entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a risk.” Later he says… “the people do not support the government of Taraki. Would our troops really help them here? In such a situation, tanks and armoured cars can’t save anything. Gromyko completely supports Andropov, saying “our army … will be the aggressor” and will have to fight the Afghan people. He opines such a move would be against international law and would wreck détente, for little gain. Kosygin says “we cannot deploy troops, since they would be fighting…. against the people.” Brezhnev was not present at either of the above meetings but was present on 19 March 1978, when he summarized and agreed with the 18 May consensus but also with the 17 May consensus to the extent of supplying aid and preparing for contingencies.

The declassified CIA intelligence report, The Politburo and Soviet Decision-Making’, written in regard to the Brezhnev era, states that it “seeks to dispel some of the aura of mystery which traditionally shrouded Kremlin decision making”. As an overview it says:

The picture which emerges is of decision-makers who are neither infallible giants nor glorified clerks, but hard-driving, able politicians whose ambitions and diverse responsibilities tend to create cross-purposes: in short, human actors within a highly tensioned, but strong and flexible, political system”.

I am sure this is correct. However, despite the 18 March consensus, that “in such a situation, tanks and armoured cars can’t save anything” the Politburo returned to the 17 March position, that they could not “lose Afghanistan” and invaded. This is despite being fully appraised of the two core problems for them, the religious dimension and the involvement of not only local actors, Iran and Pakistan, but also the US and China. Hindsight is 20/20, but history shows that not only was the 18 March consensus correct, but that the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan was a signal factor in the collapse of the Soviet system. In regard to the collapse, Gorbachev was an attendee at these meetings, but as he was then a junior, no comments by him, if any, where recorded.  

The answer is empire and the military’s central role in empire. In the Minutes of the above Politburo meetings, Minister of Defence D F Ustinov, bearing in mind the CIA characterization of “ambitions and diverse responsibilities,” plays an adroit role. On 17 March he does not engage in the political discourse, either for or against. He advises of the perilous situation in Herat and the Afghani request for military assistance. He suggests they waive payment for arms being supplied and urges urgency. He has well laid contingency plans for rapid deployment but firmly resists the idea he should go to Afghanistan, for negotiations. On 18 March 1979, he did not contradict those who are vocal in their realisation that a war could not be won, but quietly got agreement that the army should continue with its contingency operations.

Since Stalin, control of the armed forces was always held by the Chairman of the Politburo, but Brezhnev was a very sick man by 1980 and died in mid-1982. This meant that there was no real civilian control over the army at the time the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. While the war was pitched as the defence of international socialism, in reality it was fought for military  interests, to safeguard the southern border of the USSR.

Looking at the NATO + involvement in the same terms, there are many parallels. Ostensibly, the invasion was to protect the international order and combat terror, when in fact it was to take advantage of the very strategic weakness the Soviet’s intervention had engendered in the Russian sphere.

We know, from the above Politburo Minutes, that the Soviet leadership was aware of the pitfalls well before the invasion. It could not be argued that the CIA’s characterization of the Soviet rulers could not also apply to the Western rulers. How could such “able politicians” who not only had the Soviet example, but very good intelligence, continue to stumble  down the very same track.

The answer again must be empire. The killing of the Kennedys, was not so much assassination as a coup d’état by the MIC. Since then there has not been a President who has dared to challenge this power and those who have threatened to, like Carter or Trump, only lasted one term. The driving force behind the invasion was the military and the war profiteers. As WikiLeaks recently commented, profits from the war industries increased 10 fold over the period of the Afghan occupation. It remains to be seen if “the graveyard of empires” claims this skull as well, but it not looking good for them. Rather than encircle Russia and outflank China, an Islamic heartland has been created, which links resources with Chinese industry, under the Russian military umbrella. It is looking like the wheels are falling off the “American” Century already.