APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVENE
BY AMICUS CURIAE
in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)
- The basis for this application is that it is in the interests of justice for the Court to consider the following novel submission: that the UN response to the 2011 situation in Libya is a precedent for the adoption of an analogous response to the current situation in Gaza.
May it Please the Court
Precedential effect of the UN response to the 2011 situation in Libya
- The situation in Libya in early 2011 has strong parallels with the situation in southern Palestine and particularly the Gaza region ‘Gaza’ today. In both the triggering event was an insurrectional secessionist movement’s clash with the overarching polity. In both cases this movement was met with the force of the existing state, intent on crushing the insurrection and preventing any such succession. In regard to Libya, high ranking members of the Secretariat, including both the then and current Secretary-Generals, swiftly came to the conclusion that the response of the State to the insurrection, amounted to genocide. Moreover, such was the peril and urgency, that they sponsored an overwhelming military invasion, which in a month from the initial social unrest began bombing the Libyan state forces into oblivion. The combined might of NATO was pitted against a nation of some 4 million people, which within hours of the initial assault had no effective air defence. Bombers were deployed from as far away as Scotland, to lay waste to Tripoli, its capital city. To draw out the parallels and precedential authority of the UN Libyan policy and actions which bear on the current situation in Gaza, issues are discussed under the following headings:
- The general situation in Libya in 2011;
- The factual basis for the actions taken by UN organisations, together with a comparison with the factual basis for the remedy sought here;
- The UN process by which the threat of genocide was eradicated in Libya;
- The denial of a right to be heard, when genocide in issue;
- Application of fundamental principles to this proceeding.
The general situation in Libya in 2011
- While the actual situation in Libya in 2011 is a matter of dispute, for the purpose of this submission the situation is taken to be that adopted by the UN. The following chronology sets out the main events:
December 17, 2010: Mohamed Bouazizi’s Self-Immolation.
December 18, 2010 – January 4, 2011: Tunisian Protests Escalate. Although police kill ~300 protesters, UN involvement is minimal. UN human rights bodies, including Mr. Guterres’ OHCHR, issued no formal statements. UNHCR noted early refugee movements, but took no public action.
February 15–16, 2011: Libyan Protests begin. UN Involvement almost immediately. OHCHR and UNHCR commence monitoring. Mr. Guterres’ UNHCR deploys staff to Tunisia’s Ras Jdir border with Libya by February 21.[1]
February 21, 2011: Libyan UN deputy representative Ibrahim Dabbashi holds UN press conference, accusing Colonel Gadaffi of “genocide” and calling for a no-fly zone.[2]
February 22–24, 2011: OCHA claims there have been 300–400 deaths in Benghazi and that refugee numbers reach 10,000–20,000 at Tunisia/Egypt borders.[3]
OHCHR: Navi Pillay condemns “indiscriminate shootings” on February 18, citing UN staff and activist reports. On February 23, she calls for an international inquiry, estimating 600–2,000 deaths.[4]
UNHCR: Mr. Guterres directs border operations, reporting attacks on civilians/migrants and informing HRC briefings. OCHA reports displacement and casualties, supporting OHCHR’s HRC submissions.
February 24 2011 Mr. Guterres urges humanitarian access. UNHCR and OCHA scale up border operations, reporting to the HRC and Security Council.[5]
February 25, 2011: HRC convenes its 15th Special Session, adopting Resolution S-15/1 to establish the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, citing “gross and systematic” violations.[6]
February 26, 2011: Ban Ki-moon and Navi Pillay brief the Security Council, citing UN field staff and UNHCR reports. UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1970, imposing sanctions on the Libyan government, referring Libya to the ICC and mandating co-operation with UN bodies.[7]
March 1–10, 2011: Libyan Conflict escalates. UNHCR claims refugees amount to 30,000+ by March 10.
March 5 2011 Libyan government appointed Ali Abdussalam Treki[8] as its new Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as communicated to Secretary-General Moon.[9] It is unknown when the Secretary-General forwarded this notification to the Credentials Committee or when the Committee decided to stall the application. On an unknown date the USA refused Mr. Treki a visa to travel to the UN.
March 12 2011 the Arab League calls for a no-fly zone.
March 17 2011: UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizes a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, effectively greenlighting military intervention.[10]
March 19 2011: NATO bombing campaign begins.
10 April 2011: Tripoli Meeting of UN special envoy Al Khatib and African Union delegation with Libyan government. Agreement to ceasefire and political dialogue reached, but ceasefire blocked by NATO and Arab League.[11]
- The first thing to be noted about the above chronology is the alacrity with which the UN acted, when it came to Libya. The time from civil unrest breaking out in Libya, until the bombing began, was 31-32 days. The second thing to be noted is the number of casualties the UN thought warranted overwhelming military intervention.
The factual basis for the actions taken by the UN Secretariat, together with a comparison with the evidential basis for the remedy sought here
- As set out above, as a basis for military intervention OCHA alleged 300–400 deaths in Benghazi. OHCHR alleged 600–2,000 deaths overall. As can be seen by the spread of the latter claim, this was just a guess.
- In regard to the Gaza conflict, this submission relies on the evidential material provided by others supporting the Application. It is uncontestable that the civilian death toll in Gaza dwarfs the Libyan numbers. Mr. Guterres claimed 30,000+ Libyans were displaced, at the time he sponsored overwhelming military intervention. The current number of Gazan refugees is estimated to be 1,900,000.
- The specific allegations levelled against the Libyan government are set out in A/HRC/17/44, A/HRC/19/68. The ‘evidential’ foundation of these allegations, is purportedly set out in A/HRC/19/68/Add.1, but this prime document is not listed in the relevant UN documentation list and there appear to be no accessible links to it. Accordingly, no scrutiny of any kind could be undertaken. Moreover, as UN reports generally lack transparency and provide no names of those making allegations, there are no depositions on oath and still less cross-examination. This is not evidence that could be accepted by any Court. Taking the UN claims at face value there are the following allegations.
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” A/HRC/17/44, June 1, 2011.
- This report related that the: “Commission has established that the Libyan authorities engaged in excessive use of force against demonstrators in February 2011, particularly in Benghazi, Al-Bayda, Derna, and Tripoli. Security forces fired live ammunition at unarmed protesters, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. These actions constitute violations of the right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR and may amount to crimes against humanity due to their widespread and systematic nature. (para. 58) The Commission received credible reports of torture and ill-treatment of detainees by security forces, including at Abu Salim prison. Detainees were subjected to beatings, electric shocks, and prolonged solitary confinement. Enforced disappearances were reported, with individuals detained without trace, particularly in Tripoli and Misrata.” (para. 72) Government forces conducted indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, including shelling of residential neighborhoods in Misrata with mortars and Grad rockets. These attacks caused significant civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure, violating international humanitarian law.” (para. 89)
- The Commission minimized reports of abuses by anti-Government forces, stating that, “these incidents appear less systematic than Government violations.” (para. 102) It is noted that while the secessionist insurrectionaries are described as “anti-Government forces”, the government forces are described as the “Gadaffi regime”. It appears that the report writers had no sense on congruity.
- The above claims provide no numbers and no dates. Taking the first instance above, the mostly peaceful protesters claim, it is noted that this armed insurrection raged across Libya and was only stopped at the gates of Tripoli, by Turkish forces. Torture and ill-treatment of detainees is a hideous practice, but there is no mention of starvation as a torture, as is commonly employed against Gazan detainees and there are few worse examples of mass torture and ill-treatment than that carried out by the current Israeli regime.
- In regard to the “shelling of residential neighborhoods in Misrata”, without dates or recourse to A/HRC/19/68/Add.1 it cannot be known if it was indeed “indiscriminate” but in any event it must pale into insignificance when compared with the nuclear level devastation of Gaza and the civilian casualties caused by that blanket bombardment.
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A/HRC/19/68, March 2, 2012
- This report does give numbers and specific atrocities, including the claim that, “In Benghazi, security forces killed unarmed protesters systematically, with snipers targeting individuals.” (para. 29) The report also states: “In Al Qalaa, Government forces used a boy scouts’ camp as a detention site, where detainees were tortured and executed. A mass grave with 34 blindfolded bodies was uncovered, indicating extrajudicial killings.” (para. 45) The report also refers to the Yarmuk Massacre: “At the Yarmuk detention facility in Tripoli, Khamis Brigade forces killed approximately 124 detainees in August 2011 by throwing grenades into a warehouse and firing on survivors. This act constitutes a war crime.” (para. 51) While the sniping allegation appears to relate to the first phase of the conflict, the only date given is August 2011, months after the Libyan government’s offer of a ceasefire was rejected.
- The report also noted: “Thuwar (anti-Gaddafi forces) committed serious violations, including war crimes. In Sirte, Misrata militias executed 53 Gaddafi supporters in October 2011, with evidence of shootings after capture.” (para. 62) “The Commission documented widespread arbitrary arrests by thuwar, particularly of sub-Saharan Africans and dark-skinned Libyans suspected of being mercenaries. Detainees faced torture, including beatings and electric shocks, in makeshift detention centers.” (para. 67)
- While the report charged the Libyan government with “Crimes Against Humanity” along with war crimes, the insurrectionists were only charged with “war crimes and breaches of international human rights law”. As both are alleged to have conducted mass execution of prisoners, it appears that the distinction was the allegation that the Libyan government had engaged in “widespread and systematic attack on civilians” and “killed unarmed protesters systematically, with snipers targeting individuals”. Although the targeting of “sub-Saharan Africans and dark-skinned Libyans” would appear to fall within the systematic. It then appears that it was State- orchestrated systematic acts of violence, rather than individual acts of brutality, which occasioned the sponsoring of overwhelming military intervention. Systematic State level acts of violence directed by the Israeli State against civilians are extensively chronicled in the evidence before the Court.
Conclusion as to comparative crimes against humanity: Libya 2011/Palestine today
- Horrible as the acts by the Libyan government forces might have been, comparing Libya with Gaza, there is simply no comparison, either in deaths or displacement. As documented by the evidence placed before the Court, the crimes being committed by the state of Israel are orders of magnitude greater than those committed in Libya. If the Libyan situation warranted expedited destruction of the Libyan government, a fortiori the Gazan situation warrants expedited destruction of the Israeli government.
The UN process by which the threat of genocide was eradicated in Libya
Introduction
- The UN Secretary-General Moon, other high-ranking members of the Secretariat and particularly the current UN Secretary-General Guterres, played a key role in the facilitation of military intervention in Libya, by allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity and referral to the ICC.
- Within a month of the issue of genocide in Libya being raised, the UN passed Resolution 1973, which provided for overwhelming military force, to immediately crush the Libyan government and so prevent acts of genocide. In this component, the process by which this was expeditiously effected is set out. While the means adopted may not have been fair or even lawful, no criticism is intended here, but rather that where the threat of genocide is in issue, robust and decisive steps must be taken. These emergency measures, taken by the UN to prevent genocide in Libya, constitute a legal precedent for similar steps to be taken here. Most importantly, by the time Resolution 1973 was put before the General Assembly, it was apparent that there no proof of acts of genocide and it was risk of genocide that validated the use of overwhelming military force to remove a government, that may have committed acts of genocide or might do so in the future.
Mr. Guterres’ UNHCR
- In relation to civil deaths in Tunisia, Mr. Guterres took no public action, but within 6 days of the initial Libyan protests Mr. Guterres deployed staff to Tunisia’s Ras Jdir border with Libya. By February 22, 2011, UNHCR reported 5,000 refugees crossing into Tunisia, many describing “gunfire, beatings, and targeted attacks” by Gaddafi’s forces and pro-regime militias. UNHCR’s reports were relayed to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), led by Navi Pillay, which synthesized them into briefings for the HRC. Pillay’s February 23, 2011, statement, calling for an international inquiry, cited “credible reports” of violence against civilians and migrants, partly based on UNHCR’s border assessments, which provided UNHCR staff interviews with refugees reporting “chaos and violence” in Libya. These reports supported the HRC’s rationale for Resolution S-15/1, which condemned “gross and systematic” violations.[12]
- In late February 2011, addressing the UN Security Council and General Assembly, Mr. Guterres publicly urged safe passage for refugees and aid workers. On February 24, 2011, he issued a statement calling for “unhindered access” to protect civilians, emphasizing attacks on migrants as a human rights violation. This call for “unhindered access” directly links to UN Resolution 1970 (2011) 2(c): “Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country” and to cl. 26 which provided: “Calls upon all Member States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary General, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies”.
- Mr. Guterres’ core provisions, calling for internal measures and so control within Libya, were repeated in UN Resolution 1973 (2011), which generally adopted Resolution 1970 and expressly stated: “Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies”.
- Plainly there is a direct analogy with Israel’s current refusal to ensure, “the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country”.
Secretary-General Moon’s role in expediting urgent response to genocide
- The following details how quickly the UN moved in order to put Resolution 1973, the basis for overwhelming military intervention, before the General Assembly. It is this rapidity of action, in preventing genocide and indeed the corners cut and questionable processes engaged, which provides a precedent for similarly bold action against the genocide in Palestine. While it might be thought that this component of this submission is too detailed, it is submitted that when asserting precedent, it is essential to establish the factual basis, as precedent is only applicable in similar contexts.
- On February 21, 2011, the UN Secretariat, apparently on the authority of Secretary-General Moon, platformed Mr. Dabbashi’s pivotal attack on the Libyan Government. In this press conference at the UN headquarters, Mr. Dabbashi set the agenda to come, as follows: “The Libyan regime has already started a genocide against the Libyan people… We call on the UN to impose a no-fly zone to cut off all supplies of arms and mercenaries to the regime.”[13] Thus, it was at a UN press conference, a mere 6 or 7 days after protests broke out in Benghazi, that the agenda was set, for a no-fly zone. As no evidence was provided that arms and mercenaries were being flown into Libya, Libya having more arms than you could shake a stick at, this claim quietly morphed into a bombing campaign.
- Mr. Dabbashi had been Libya’s deputy permanent representative, but he was plainly not representing the Libyan government in making this attack on it. This UN press conference was billed: “Press Conference by Permanent Mission of Libya” when Mr. Dabbashi was not acting in the course of his employment and so was not lawfully a member of the “Permanent Mission of Libya”. The UN never disassociated itself from Mr. Dabbashi’s claims, even when its own investigations failed to find evidence of genocide. Moreover, after Mr. Dabbashi’s resignation as the Libyan UN representative, he appears to have been provided with de facto status within the UN, a status devoid of procedural or lawful foundation, until his replacement by the National Transitional Counsel ‘NTC’ representative.
- The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) provides that states control diplomatic appointments. Commentary on the General Assembly Rules of Procedure, Rule 27 states that a Credentials Committee verifies delegation credentials, ensuring state authorization.[14] This means that only those authorised by their respective state have standing at the UN. Despite there being no lawful basis for the UN to allow an individual, who had ceased to represent the government who had appointed him to the UN, to make a public statement under the aegis of the UN, when genocide is in issue, such niceties can be brushed aside.
- On March 5 2011 the Libyan government attempted to appoint Mr. Ali Abdussalam Treki as a representative to the United Nations, replacing Mohamed Shalgham, who had defected. Mr. Treki had served as the President of the 64th General Assembly of the UN and served three times as his country’s representative from 1982 to 1984, when he also chaired the General Assembly’s Fourth Committee (Decolonization) and represented Libya on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights; from 1986 to 1990; and most recently in 2003. Earlier, in 1982, he served as a Vice-President of the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. A veteran in the fields of diplomacy and international relations, Mr. Treki served as Libya’s Ambassador to France from 1995 to 1999, as Permanent Representative to the League of Arab States in Cairo (Egypt) from 1991 to 1994, and as Foreign Minister from 1977 to 1980. Mr. Treki also played a significant role in the creation of the African Union and had been directly involved in mediating several conflicts in Africa, notably in the Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Djibouti-Eritrea, as well as in other parts of the world, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus and the Philippines. Over the course of a career spanning four decades, Mr. Treki led Libya’s delegation to numerous African summits and conferences including ministerial meetings of the former Organization of African Unity and, more recently, of the African Union Executive Council. In addition, he headed the Libyan delegation to summits and conferences of the League of Arab States and chaired the League’s Council of Ministers from 1976 to 1977. He also led his country’s delegation to summits and ministerial conferences of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and chaired the Council of Ministers of Islamic States. He further headed Libya’s delegation to ministerial meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as to the Movement’s 1979 summit conference in Cuba.
- The request for Mr. Treki’s appointment was communicated by the leader of the Libyan government, to the UN Secretary-General two weeks prior to Resolution 1973, in accordance with UN Rule 27 which provides: “The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General if possible not less than one week before the opening of the session.”[15] The requirement that this nomination be provided “not less than one week before the opening of the session” relates to the session at which the State Party wants the nominated representative to represent it, by default the next session after the one-week “if possible” period required for consideration.
- The 2011 Credentials Committee comprised of China, Russia and the United States, together in this case with Luxembourg, as the EU representative. As a great power door-keeper, Credential Committee’s deliberations are largely kept secret. Wikileaks has provided some public access to its machinations, such as in regard to Honduras in 2009[16]. There is no publically available record of the Committee’s consideration of Mr. Treki’s application, so it is unknown if in fact it was considered and if so, when. The timing of this is critical, as typically uncontested credentials are approved within weeks during regular sessions[17]. In the case of South Sudan, it took 5 days, on or about July 14, 2011[18]. An application could have been put before the general Assembly in any of the plenary sessions in April[19] and here were numerous plenary sessions prior to September period at which Mr. Treki’s credentialisation could have been put to the General Assembly. As discussed below, the issue of credentialisation of a representative for Libya was only dealt with at the General Assembly ‘GA’ plenary meeting on 16 September 2011. This was in breach of UN Rule 28 which provides:
A Credentials Committee shall be appointed at the beginning of each
session. It shall consist of nine members, who shall be appointed by the
General Assembly on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall
elect its own officers. It shall examine the credentials of representatives
and report without delay.
(emphasis added.)
- All that appears to be publically available in regard the Libyan nomination process is the Committee’s report[20], of 16 September 2011, which makes no mention of the Treki referral and the discussion of that report at the UN 2nd plenary meeting of 16 September 2011, at which Mr. Al-Nasser Presided[21]. Mr. Al-Nasser was also the Representative of Qatar, the Arab League’s implacable opponent of Libyan oil and Colonel Gaddafi, which committed troops to overthrow him. There is a follow up report of the Committee, but this adds nothing.
- At the 16 September 2011 meeting of the General Assembly the chair of the Credentials Committee stated:
The report lists all those Member States that had, at the time of the Committee’s meeting on 14 September 2011, submitted formal credentials within the meaning of rule 27 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.
- As the process undertaken by Secretary-General Moon and the Credentials Committee is entirely opaque, it is unknown if this statement is false or misleading. It is known that an application for credentialisation of Mr. Treki was made to the Secretary-General. As the Libyan government gave notice to the Secretary-General of its proposed representative pursuant to UN Rule 27, “formal credentials” were submitted. That Mr. Treki’s application was rejected by the Committee did not mean it was not submitted, as implied by the Credential Committee’s claim that its report listed, “all those Member States that had, at the time of the Committee’s meeting on 14 September 2011, submitted formal credentials”. (emphasis added) As raised by the Angolan Representative at the GA meeting of 16 September 2011: “The Committee’s report [A/66/450] lacks transparency… We must ask why alternative credentials [Treki’s] were not considered.” (p. 23)
- Moreover, this was not a simple matter of uncontroversial credentialisation but at issue was a contested one, which raised the criteria for statehood in a contested setting.
Criteria for statehood
- The Credential Committee and apparently Secretary-General Moon proceeded as if the NTC merely required to have its application for credentials approved, a generally uncontroversial procedure, when in fact, it required consideration of whether admission as a new state was in issue.
- The underlying cause of the Libyan government’s delegitimisation by the UN was an insurrectional secessionist movement in Cyrenaica. Moreover, Colonel Gaddafi’s position as leader was largely founded on his balancing of the West and Eastern tribal groupings interests. Once one of these factions had gone its own way, his middle ground position, as he literally hailed from central Sirte, was no longer tenable. As much as the NATO invasion, this is what doomed him. Post this insurrection in the East and until today, there now exists two states, where there once was one. That one names itself after the prior unitary State, does not automatically make it that state, as was in issue in the fall-out of NATO’s dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the claim to that State’s seat in the UN, by contending factions.
- The criteria for Statehood is that set out in the Montevideo Convention (1933) which defines statehood as meeting the following criteria: (1) permanent population, (2) defined territory, (3) effective government, and (4) capacity to conduct international relations. The issue is not that the NTC could not meet these criteria, but that these criteria could not be assumed in this case, particularly in regard to “defined territory” but also, “(4) capacity to conduct international relations. This latter criteria came into play, depending on when the contending applications were made. Mr. Treki’s application to be recognised as the Libyan government’s UN representative and hence reflect it’s “capacity to conduct international relations” by a veteran diplomat, was made on 5 March 2011. Any late entry of the NTC candidate and the preferential treatment then accorded to its candidate, as discussed below, strongly indicated that at the first plenary session in April it was the Libyan government’s candidate who best met criteria (4).
- As can be seen, the process by which these criteria could be resolved and subsequently inform any decision by the Security Council and the General Assembly were of a different order to credentualisation of a new representative of a pre-existing State party. The UN Charter, at Article 18(2) provides that decisions on important questions, including membership, require a two-thirds majority, as set out in the General Assembly Rules of Procedure, Rule 83, whereas Rule 27 credentualisation of a new permanent representative of a pre-existing State party, already in the UN, is determined by simple majority.
- Again there is the precedent that genocide trumps all and that even foundational rules of the UN can be cast aside in order to mitigate this risk.
Controversy
- The nature of conduct of the UN General Assembly session, at which the NTC candidate was approved is indicated by the UN press release title: After Much Wrangling, General Assembly Seats National Transitional Council of Libya as Country’s Representative (September 16, 2011) This press release details a contentious debate, including opposition from the non-aligned states (e.g., Angola, Nicaragua) who argued the NTC was a NATO-imposed faction, not a legitimate government. Nicaragua’s representative stating: “The National Transitional Council… is not the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. It is a faction imposed by NATO bombers.” (p. 24-25)[22]
- This was plainly a controversial issue of the highest order, central to the nature of the UN itself and the tension between the colonialists and the colonialised. For the former to rig the game, by abstracting any reference to the Treki nomination, could be seen as contemptuous distain for the 3rd world in a disputed vote, with 32 nations either voting against recognition of the NTC representative or abstaining. However, it is submitted that the great powers were moved by a higher calling, to spare nothing in order to stamp out the risk of genocide.
- In attempting to arrive at the extent of measures adopted in the Libyan context, the lack of UN transparency means that there are two possibilities in play:
- Secretary General Moon did not inform the Credentials Committee of the Libyan government’s nomination of Mr Treki;
- Despite being informed of the nomination by Secretary Moon, the Credentials Committee breached R27:28 and lied to the General assembly in order to cover up its unlawful conduct.
- While this may seem to leave the matter unresolved, together with the USA’s refusal of a visa to Mr Treki, preventing him from advocating for his credentialisation, there is an evidential basis for civil conspiracy. Assuming premise (a) above, the Credentials Committee were put on notice of the Treki nomination, at the latest by Angola’s protest on 16 September 2011. That the Credentials Committee took no steps to rectify the situation or even raise it, suggests it was in fact seized of the nomination. Assuming premise (b) above, Secretary Moon, fixed with knowledge of R27:28 by his office, knew or must have known, after a matter of weeks, that somehow the nomination process had miscarried and was under an obligation to make enquiries, but which given the outcome, could not have been made. In the case of the USA, there is also propensity evidence.
- The purpose of this submission is not to suggest that Secretary-General Moon, Russia, China, USA and the EU, by its Luxemburgian plenipotentiary, should be tried for conspiracy, but rather that there is an evidential basis that they either independently acted illegally, or entered into a conspiracy to break the UN Rules and the laws of natural justice to deny Libya the right to be heard, in relation to its own fate. As set out above, Mr Treki was a seasoned diplomat with very strong associations with the African Union. His potential, as a UN representative, advocating for the Libyan government and marshalling opposition to military intervention, is demonstrated by the unlawful and deceitful conduct of those who blocked his appointment. Moreover, given his depth of experience in mediating conflict zones, the conflict between West and East Libya might have been resolved. As discussed in ‘UN Security Council Sanctions and Mediation in Libya’ (July 4, 2022),[23] the UN policy here displayed a dysfunctional ambivalence between mediation and intervention.
- The key point is again that where there is genocide or real risk of genocide, as crimes against humanity are being committed, even the right to be heard must give way and the Libyan precedent is authority for there being no requirement that Israel be given an opportunity to respond to the Application, as this permits delay and so further genocide or risk of genocide.
Application of Resolutions 1970 & 1973 to the genocide in Gaza
- While these two resolutions were rolled out as a two-stage strategy, this does not detract from their validity, as all means are valid in the suppression of genocide. As one builds on the other and the latter refers to the former, only relevant parts of Resolution 1973 ‘1973’ most relevant to the current genocide will be set out here. 1973 begins by listing wrongs, indistinguishable from those wrongs with the Court is burdened with in full measure in this application. 1973 refers to: “grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties. This if anything would understate the situation in Gaza. It reiterates the responsibility of State authorities to “protect the population” and reaffirms that “parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians”. Plainly Israel has failed in this obligation. 1973 condemns gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions, all too familiar in the Gaza genocide. 1973 further condemns “acts of violence and intimidation committed by the
Libyan authorities against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel”. None of the UN claims about the Libyan government viewed in preparation for this submission explicitly describe such conduct in Libya, but the murder of literally hundreds of journalists and the like in Gaza is an act un-paralleled in war, deserving of universal condemnation. Similarly, 1973 does not refer to attacks on medical personal. The targeted assassination and mass incarceration of medical personnel by the state of Israeli is inhuman conduct, rarely seen in war and conducted here on a scale never before seen.
- While superficially Resolution 1973 could be seen as not actually permitting overwhelming military intervention, this was simply legerdermain for public relations purposes. The imposition of a “no fly zone” together with the ability to take “all necessary measures” provided the platform for the action no fly zone, first advocated for at the UN press conference on 21 February 2011. This predictable outcome was known at the time. Cuban delegate Pedro Núñez Mosquera explicitly warned that military intervention would cause mass civilian deaths (UNSC S/PV.6498, 17 March 2011, pp. 7–8)[24]. His prediction proved accurate: NATO’s campaign killed thousands, including during the siege of Sirte. See also Cuba’s opposition in UNSC Resolution 1973 voting records (S/RES/1973).[25] “Cuba—a small Global South nation—saw through NATO’s ruse in 2011, while powerful states enabled catastrophe. Today, the same states shield Israel. The playbook hasn’t changed.”
- The bombing commenced on 19 March 2011 and continued despite the Libyan government’s agreement to a ceasefire on 10 April 2011. The slaughter continued at least till the torture and murder of Colonel Gadaffi on 20 October 2011, together with the killing of his son Mutassim and about 67 other members of his convoy on that day. In all this time no challenge was made to the reach of Resolution 1973, by any members of the Security Council.
Bosnia v Serbia
- While these submissions engage with the precedent created by the UN response to the Libyan situation, this is because of the very proximal analogies that can be drawn to the Application and the situation in Palestine. However, it must not be forgotten that the UN Libyan response is itself patterned on the UN response to NATO’s dismemberment of Yugoslavia and so we are looking at a long term UN policy in regard to State Party’s violent suppression of internal dissent. In Bosnia v. Serbia (2007) the ICJ ruled that Serbia had a positive duty prevent the Srebrenica genocide pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
Analogous international condemnation to the ongoing risk of genocide in Gaza
- Continuing with the analogy with events in Libya in 2011, at the Sixty-fifth General Assembly Plenary 76th Meeting Secretary-General Moon stated that:
“The world has spoken with one voice: we demand an immediate end to the violence against civilians and full respect for their fundamental human rights, including those of peaceful assembly and free speech,” said Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his address to the Assembly. He welcomed the recommendation of the Human Rights Council to suspend Libya’s membership “so long as the violence continued”.
- Mr. Ban also commended the Security Council’s decision over the weekend to refer the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, and called for the urgent dispatching of an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate alleged violations of international human rights in the country, in line with the Human Rights Council’s recommendation.[26]
- SUSAN RICE (United States) said the unprecedented suspension of Libya from the Human Rights Council was a “harsh rebuke, but one that Libya’s leaders had brought down upon themselves”. She said the United States continued to be appalled by the situation in Libya. “This action sends another clear warning to Mr. Qadhafi and those who stand by him: they must stop the killing.” The General Assembly had come together “to speak with one voice to Libya’s unrepentant rulers”. When the only way that a leader could cling to power was to violate the human rights of his own people, he had lost all legitimacy to rule. “He must go, and he must go now,” she said.
- TSUNEO NISHIDA (Japan) said his delegation was deeply concerned about the “gross and systematic violations of human rights” currently being committed by the Libyan Government, and had co-sponsored the resolution to suspend Libya’s membership in the Human Rights Council.
- CHRISTIAN WENAWESER (Liechtenstein), welcoming the Assembly’s action, voiced grave concern at the possibility that crimes against humanity were being committed in Libya “at this very moment”.
- GARY FRANCIS QUINLAN (Australia) said the gross human rights violations in Libya warranted that country’s suspension from Human Rights Council. It was untenable that “a regime so clearly failing in its responsibility” would be fit to serve on such a United Nations body.
- JIM MCLAY (New Zealand) expressed his condolences to the victims’ families. The Libyan regime’s systematic use of force evoked memories of the actions of other tyrants. That use of force could constitute crimes against humanity. “No regime has the right to turn its own country and the lives of its own people into a living hell,”.
- Plainly all these statements apply a fortiori to Israel in the present circumstances and to its Leader Mr. Netanyahoo.
Legal principles
- As set out above, it was the real risk of genocide in Libya which validated the destruction of the Libyan government, by massive military intervention. Plainly the Court has no such executive power. However, it is submitted that this precedent provides that the real risk of genocide, arising from ongoing crimes against humanity, calls for the most extreme sanction. As submitted below, the most extreme sanction the Court can impose is to find that as Israel has persistently violated the Principles contained in the UN Charter, the Security Council should recommend to the General Assembly, that Israel be expelled from the UN for breach of Chapter II Article 6. This is not an empty gesture, as comity obliges proportionate consideration by the Security Council, which functions as the executive within the UN constitutional framework. Moreover, on the authority of the Libyan precedent, Israel has by its own conduct, forgone the right to be heard.
- The submissions set out above demonstrate a binding legal precedent, which demands parity of action. The most fundamental principle of law is equality before the law and without this principle there is no law. As such it forms a central part of the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, as follows: “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” There is no law for Serbia and another for Israel, there is no law for Libya and another for Israel. Precedent and parity are expressions of this fundamental principle. Justice must be blind and the scales evenly balanced, without this we have no law.
- The critical feature of this precedent is that it is not genocide, but real risk of genocide, on the basis of evidence of crimes against humanity, that triggers ultimate sanction.
- The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides:
Article VIII
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.
- The UN Charter, Chapter II Article 6 provides:
A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
- The state of Israel has violated “Principles contained in the present Charter” such as the principle of “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small” since the Nakba. Putting aside all the violation from then to current times, this Application was filed on 29 December 2023 and has since been joined by a host of nations. While under the purview of this Court, in contumelious disregard for the Court’s acceptance of the Application, even on a prima facie basis, together with the concerns of leading members of the Secretariat and foundational organs of the UN, the state of Israel has persistently continued in its violations, unabated, despite the cumulative damage of its actions.
- It is submitted that the above submissions, when considered together with the evidence provided by those supporting the Application, ground the following premises:
- In both the Yugoslavian and Libyan theatres, when insurrectionary succession movements arose, the UN adopted a policy of preventing further crimes against humanity, being committed against such insurrectionaries, by either sanctioning or sponsoring overwhelming military intervention, directed against the State Party engaged in crimes against humanity;
- In Libya the use of overwhelming military intervention to counter genocide was a key driver, from its UN endorsed articulation by Mr. Dabbashi to Resolutions 1970 & 1973;
- In this application genocide is asserted, as is the application of Article IX of the Genocide Convention;
- The crimes against humanity which have triggered the UN sponsoring of overwhelming military intervention are systemic acts of violence against non-combatant civilians;
- The catalogued crimes against humanity and other war crimes which in Libya precipitated the sponsoring of overwhelming military intervention are vastly overmatched by the same crimes against humanity and other war crimes which have been committed by Israel against the civilian population of Gaza;
- The period for which such crimes have been allowed to continue in Gaza, is vastly longer than that which pertained in Libya.
- The vast disparity between the extent of crimes against humanity committed by the government of Libya and those committed and continuing to be committed by the government of Israel leaves no room for nuance or doubt. The evidence screams at you and is heard by the whole world.
- There is an alternative premise that can be derived from these submissions. Secretary-General Guterre’s role in the destruction of the Libyan government and the dismemberment of Libya in 2011 compares badly with his failure to take comparable steps in regard to Israel. This demonstrates that the Secretary-General is two-faced, to the point of fraud, or has failed the UN in its first objective, which seems to be needed to be recalled:
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind …
- The Preamble to the United Nations Charter continues to state that the purpose of the United Nations is “to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest. There is no common interest in armies butchering children. Again we are reduced to failing back on the most basic tenets of civilization. While it could be argued that the power of the UN is sequestered by the Security Council, in comparable entities to the UN, ministers of parliaments and leaders with integrity choose resignation over dishonor. How would the Security Council look if the Secretary General and all the high ranking officers of the Secretariat walked out? That hasn’t happened, so are we left with a zombie organization that moves only tectonically, by continental grift?
- Meanwhile, the General Assembly is a trance, hypnotised by awards of honorifics and other geegaws, it has succumbed to the veto power of the Security Council, itself a collection of walruses and carpenters. This thieves’ kitchen figures here twice, once in its Credentials Committee short form, duping the General Assembly by concealing the Libyan government’s attempt to regularize its formal standing with the UN and again in its long form, duping the world with its “no fly-zone” that devastated cities and brought death from the air to so many. And so the UN follows the League of Nations, as a failed project and for the same reasons.
- In this tragic situation, it falls to the ICJ to uphold the principles it and the UN were founded on. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer[27] an emergency powers case heard during the Korean war, Supreme Court Justice Jackson, who had been the lead US counsel to the Nuremberg Tribunal, struck a note of foreboding, warning:
Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity. Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power that do not show on the face of the Constitution.[28]
- But it is Justice Jackson’s final words that are most chilling. Speaking of the US Constitution, he wrote:
Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.[29]
- After the failure of the General Assembly and the Secretariat, that is the duty of the ICJ, to hold fast to the basic norms the UN was founded on and to hold genocidal States to account. The UN Charter Chapter II Article 6 provides:
A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
- The Court has no executive power, but it has a moral suasion. Israeli has “persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter”. It is time for the ICJ to speak truth to power, or shut itself down. The only thing worse than lack of justice, is a façade of justice.
16 May 2025
______________
G E Minchin
counsel
[1] https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2011/2/4d63f0b39/unhcr-responds-libya-crisis.html
[2] https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/110221_Libya.doc.htm
[3] https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-crisis-situation-report-no-1
[4] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2011/02/pillay-calls-international-inquiry-libyan-violence-and- justice-victims
[5] https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2011/2/4d66a7b29/unhcr-calls-safe-passage-libya.html
[6] https://undocs.org/A/HRC/S-15/1
[7] https://undocs.org/S/RES/1970(2011)
[8] https://web.archive.org/web/20150912040003/https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/bio412
[9] https://web.archive.org/web/20110308005950/https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE72400H
[10] https://undocs.org/S/RES/1973(2011)
[11] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/4/10/au-team-arrives-in-libya-to-push-for-ceasefire
[12] https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/ga11047.doc.htm (Archived here)
[13] https://undocs.org/A/66/450
[14] https://undocs.org/A/66/PV.7
[15] http://www.cubaminrex.cu/en/cuba-reiterates-opposition-foreign-intervention-libya
[16] https://undocs.org/A/520/Rev.20
[17] https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09UNNEWYORK639_a.html
[18] https://undocs.org/A/RES/65/308
[19] https://press.un.org/en/2011/ga11137.doc.htm
[20] https://www.icj-cij.org/case/91
[21] https://undocs.org/S/PV.6498
[22] https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13450.doc.htm
[23] https://brill.com/view/journals/gg/28/3/article-p383_383.xml
[24] UN Press Release GA/11047 (archived here).
[26] Press Release SC/10187.)
[27] 343 U.S. 579 (1952). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/343/579/
[28] Ibid 653.
[29] Ibid 655.