INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVENE

BY AMICUS CURIAE

in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)

  1. The basis for this application is that it is in the interests of justice for the Court to consider the following novel submission: that the UN response to the 2011 situation in Libya is a precedent for the adoption of an analogous response to the current situation in Gaza.

May it Please the Court

Precedential effect of the UN response to the 2011 situation in Libya  

  • The situation in Libya in early 2011 has strong parallels with the situation in southern Palestine and particularly the Gaza region ‘Gaza’ today. In both the triggering event was an insurrectional secessionist movement’s clash with the overarching polity. In both cases this movement was met with the force of the existing state, intent on crushing the insurrection and preventing any such succession.  In regard to Libya, high ranking members of the Secretariat, including both the then and current Secretary-Generals, swiftly came to the conclusion that the response of the State to the insurrection, amounted to genocide. Moreover, such was the peril and urgency, that they sponsored an overwhelming military invasion, which in a month from the initial social unrest began bombing the Libyan state forces into oblivion. The combined might of NATO was pitted against a nation of some 4 million people, which within hours of the initial assault had no effective air defence. Bombers were deployed from as far away as Scotland, to lay waste to Tripoli, its capital city. To draw out the parallels and precedential authority of the UN Libyan policy and actions which bear on the current situation in Gaza, issues are discussed under the following headings:
  • The general situation in Libya in 2011;
  • The factual basis for the actions taken by UN organisations, together with a comparison with the factual basis for the remedy sought here;
  • The UN process by which the threat of genocide was eradicated in Libya;
  • The denial of a right to be heard, when genocide in issue;
  • Application of fundamental principles to this proceeding.

The general situation in Libya in 2011

  • While the actual situation in Libya in 2011 is a matter of dispute, for the purpose of this submission the situation is taken to be that adopted by the UN.  The following chronology sets out the main events:

December 17, 2010: Mohamed Bouazizi’s Self-Immolation.

December 18, 2010 – January 4, 2011: Tunisian Protests Escalate. Although police kill ~300 protesters, UN involvement is minimal. UN human rights bodies, including Mr. Guterres’ OHCHR, issued no formal statements. UNHCR noted early refugee movements, but took no public action.

February 15–16, 2011: Libyan Protests begin. UN Involvement almost immediately. OHCHR and UNHCR commence monitoring. Mr. Guterres’ UNHCR deploys staff to Tunisia’s Ras Jdir border with Libya by February 21.[1]

February 21, 2011:  Libyan UN deputy representative Ibrahim Dabbashi holds UN press conference, accusing Colonel Gadaffi of “genocide” and calling for a no-fly zone.[2]

February 22–24, 2011: OCHA claims there have been 300–400 deaths in Benghazi and that refugee numbers reach 10,000–20,000 at Tunisia/Egypt borders.[3]  

OHCHR: Navi Pillay condemns “indiscriminate shootings” on February 18, citing UN staff and activist reports. On February 23, she calls for an international inquiry, estimating 600–2,000 deaths.[4]

UNHCR: Mr. Guterres directs border operations, reporting attacks on civilians/migrants and informing HRC briefings. OCHA reports displacement and casualties, supporting OHCHR’s HRC submissions.

February 24 2011 Mr. Guterres urges humanitarian access. UNHCR and OCHA scale up border operations, reporting to the HRC and Security Council.[5]

February 25, 2011: HRC convenes its 15th Special Session, adopting Resolution S-15/1 to establish the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, citing “gross and systematic” violations.[6]

February 26, 2011: Ban Ki-moon and Navi Pillay brief the Security Council, citing UN field staff and UNHCR reports. UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1970, imposing sanctions on the Libyan government, referring Libya to the ICC and mandating co-operation with UN bodies.[7]

March 1–10, 2011: Libyan Conflict escalates. UNHCR claims refugees amount to 30,000+ by March 10.

March 5 2011 Libyan government appointed Ali Abdussalam Treki[8] as its new Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as communicated to Secretary-General Moon.[9] It is unknown when the Secretary-General forwarded this notification to the Credentials Committee or when the Committee decided to stall the application. On an unknown date the USA refused Mr. Treki a visa to travel to the UN.

March 12 2011 the Arab League calls for a no-fly zone.

March 17 2011: UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizes a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, effectively greenlighting military intervention.[10]

March 19 2011: NATO bombing campaign begins.

10 April 2011: Tripoli Meeting of UN special envoy Al Khatib and African Union delegation with Libyan government. Agreement to ceasefire and political dialogue reached, but ceasefire blocked by NATO and Arab League.[11]

  • The first thing to be noted about the above chronology is the alacrity with which the UN acted, when it came to Libya. The time from civil unrest breaking out in Libya, until the bombing began, was 31-32 days. The second thing to be noted is the number of casualties the UN thought warranted overwhelming military intervention.

The factual basis for the actions taken by the UN Secretariat, together with a comparison with the evidential basis for the remedy sought here

  • As set out above, as a basis for military intervention OCHA alleged 300–400 deaths in Benghazi. OHCHR alleged 600–2,000 deaths overall. As can be seen by the spread of the latter claim, this was just a guess.
  • In regard to the Gaza conflict, this submission relies on the evidential material provided by others supporting the Application. It is uncontestable that the civilian death toll in Gaza dwarfs the Libyan numbers. Mr. Guterres claimed 30,000+ Libyans were displaced, at the time he sponsored overwhelming military intervention. The current number of Gazan refugees is estimated to be 1,900,000.
  • The specific allegations levelled against the Libyan government are set out in A/HRC/17/44, A/HRC/19/68. The ‘evidential’ foundation of these allegations, is purportedly set out in A/HRC/19/68/Add.1, but this prime document is not listed in the relevant UN documentation list and there appear to be no accessible links to it. Accordingly, no scrutiny of any kind could be undertaken. Moreover, as UN reports generally lack transparency and provide no names of those making allegations, there are no depositions on oath and still less cross-examination. This is not evidence that could be accepted by any Court.  Taking the UN claims at face value there are the following allegations.

Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” A/HRC/17/44, June 1, 2011.

  •  This report related that the: “Commission has established that the Libyan authorities engaged in excessive use of force against demonstrators in February 2011, particularly in Benghazi, Al-Bayda, Derna, and Tripoli. Security forces fired live ammunition at unarmed protesters, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. These actions constitute violations of the right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR and may amount to crimes against humanity due to their widespread and systematic nature. (para. 58) The Commission received credible reports of torture and ill-treatment of detainees by security forces, including at Abu Salim prison. Detainees were subjected to beatings, electric shocks, and prolonged solitary confinement. Enforced disappearances were reported, with individuals detained without trace, particularly in Tripoli and Misrata.” (para. 72) Government forces conducted indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, including shelling of residential neighborhoods in Misrata with mortars and Grad rockets. These attacks caused significant civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure, violating international humanitarian law.” (para. 89)
  • The Commission minimized reports of abuses by anti-Government forces, stating that, “these incidents appear less systematic than Government violations.” (para. 102) It is noted that while the secessionist insurrectionaries are described as “anti-Government forces”, the government forces are described as the “Gadaffi regime”. It appears that the report writers had no sense on congruity.
  1. The above claims provide no numbers and no dates. Taking the first instance above, the mostly peaceful protesters claim, it is noted that this armed insurrection raged across Libya and was only stopped at the gates of Tripoli, by Turkish forces. Torture and ill-treatment of detainees is a hideous practice, but there is no mention of starvation as a torture, as is commonly employed against Gazan detainees and there are few worse examples of mass torture and ill-treatment than that carried out by the current Israeli regime.
  1. In regard to the “shelling of residential neighborhoods in Misrata”, without dates or recourse to A/HRC/19/68/Add.1 it cannot be known if it was indeed “indiscriminate” but in any event it must pale into insignificance when compared with the nuclear level devastation of Gaza and the civilian casualties caused by that blanket bombardment.

Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A/HRC/19/68, March 2, 2012

  1. This report does give numbers and specific atrocities, including the claim that, “In Benghazi, security forces killed unarmed protesters systematically, with snipers targeting individuals.” (para. 29) The report also states: “In Al Qalaa, Government forces used a boy scouts’ camp as a detention site, where detainees were tortured and executed. A mass grave with 34 blindfolded bodies was uncovered, indicating extrajudicial killings.” (para. 45) The report also refers to the Yarmuk Massacre: “At the Yarmuk detention facility in Tripoli, Khamis Brigade forces killed approximately 124 detainees in August 2011 by throwing grenades into a warehouse and firing on survivors. This act constitutes a war crime.” (para. 51) While the sniping allegation appears to relate to the first phase of the conflict, the only date given is August 2011, months after the Libyan government’s offer of a ceasefire was rejected.
  1. The report also noted: “Thuwar (anti-Gaddafi forces) committed serious violations, including war crimes. In Sirte, Misrata militias executed 53 Gaddafi supporters in October 2011, with evidence of shootings after capture.” (para. 62) “The Commission documented widespread arbitrary arrests by thuwar, particularly of sub-Saharan Africans and dark-skinned Libyans suspected of being mercenaries. Detainees faced torture, including beatings and electric shocks, in makeshift detention centers.” (para. 67)
  1. While the report charged the Libyan government with “Crimes Against Humanity” along with war crimes, the insurrectionists were only charged with “war crimes and breaches of international human rights law”. As both are alleged to have conducted mass execution of prisoners, it appears that the distinction was the allegation that the Libyan government had engaged in “widespread and systematic attack on civilians” and “killed unarmed protesters systematically, with snipers targeting individuals”. Although the targeting of “sub-Saharan Africans and dark-skinned Libyans” would appear to fall within the systematic.  It then appears that it was State- orchestrated systematic acts of violence, rather than individual acts of brutality, which occasioned the sponsoring of overwhelming military intervention. Systematic State level acts of violence directed by the Israeli State against civilians are extensively chronicled in the evidence before the Court.

Conclusion as to comparative crimes against humanity: Libya 2011/Palestine today

  1. Horrible as the acts by the Libyan government forces might have been, comparing Libya with Gaza, there is simply no comparison, either in deaths or displacement. As documented by the evidence placed before the Court, the crimes being committed by the state of Israel are orders of magnitude greater than those committed in Libya. If the Libyan situation warranted expedited destruction of the Libyan government, a fortiori the Gazan situation warrants expedited destruction of the Israeli government.

The UN process by which the threat of genocide was eradicated in Libya

Introduction

  1. The UN Secretary-General Moon, other high-ranking members of the Secretariat and particularly the current UN Secretary-General Guterres, played a key role in the facilitation of military intervention in Libya, by allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity and  referral to the ICC.
  1. Within a month of the issue of genocide in Libya being raised, the UN passed Resolution 1973, which provided for overwhelming military force, to immediately crush the Libyan government and so prevent acts of genocide. In this component, the process by which this was expeditiously effected is set out. While the means adopted may not have been fair or even lawful, no criticism is intended here, but rather that where the threat of genocide is in issue, robust and decisive steps must be taken. These emergency measures, taken by the UN to prevent genocide in Libya, constitute a legal precedent for similar steps to be taken here. Most importantly, by the time Resolution 1973 was put before the General Assembly, it was apparent that there no proof of acts of genocide and it was risk of genocide that validated the use of overwhelming military force to remove a government, that may have committed acts of genocide or might do so in the future.

Mr. Guterres’ UNHCR

  1. In relation to civil deaths in Tunisia, Mr. Guterres took no public action, but within 6 days of the initial Libyan protests Mr. Guterres deployed staff to Tunisia’s Ras Jdir border with Libya. By February 22, 2011, UNHCR reported 5,000 refugees crossing into Tunisia, many describing “gunfire, beatings, and targeted attacks” by Gaddafi’s forces and pro-regime militias. UNHCR’s reports were relayed to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), led by Navi Pillay, which synthesized them into briefings for the HRC. Pillay’s February 23, 2011, statement, calling for an international inquiry, cited “credible reports” of violence against civilians and migrants, partly based on UNHCR’s border assessments, which provided UNHCR staff interviews with refugees reporting “chaos and violence” in Libya. These reports supported the HRC’s rationale for Resolution S-15/1, which condemned “gross and systematic” violations.[12]
  1. In late February 2011, addressing the UN Security Council and General Assembly, Mr. Guterres publicly urged safe passage for refugees and aid workers. On February 24, 2011, he issued a statement calling for “unhindered access” to protect civilians, emphasizing attacks on migrants as a human rights violation. This call for “unhindered access” directly links to UN Resolution 1970 (2011) 2(c): “Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country” and to cl. 26 which provided: “Calls upon all Member States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary General, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies”.
  • Mr. Guterres’ core provisions, calling for internal measures and so control within Libya, were repeated in UN Resolution 1973 (2011), which generally adopted Resolution 1970 and expressly stated: “Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies”.
  • Plainly there is a direct analogy with Israel’s current refusal to ensure, “the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country”.

Secretary-General Moon’s role in expediting urgent response to genocide

  • The following details how quickly the UN moved in order to put Resolution 1973, the basis for overwhelming military intervention, before the General Assembly. It is this rapidity of action, in preventing genocide and indeed the corners cut and questionable processes engaged, which provides a precedent for similarly bold action against the genocide in Palestine. While it might be thought that this component of this submission is too detailed, it is submitted that when asserting precedent, it is essential to establish the factual basis, as precedent is only applicable in similar contexts.
  • On February 21, 2011, the UN Secretariat, apparently on the authority of Secretary-General Moon, platformed Mr. Dabbashi’s pivotal attack on the Libyan Government.  In this press conference at the UN headquarters, Mr. Dabbashi set the agenda to come, as follows: “The Libyan regime has already started a genocide against the Libyan people… We call on the UN to impose a no-fly zone to cut off all supplies of arms and mercenaries to the regime.”[13] Thus, it was at a UN press conference, a mere 6 or 7 days after protests broke out in Benghazi, that the agenda was set, for a no-fly zone. As no evidence was provided that arms and mercenaries were being flown into Libya, Libya having more arms than you could shake a stick at, this claim quietly morphed into a bombing campaign.
  • Mr. Dabbashi had been Libya’s deputy permanent representative, but he was plainly not representing the Libyan government in making this attack on it.  This UN press conference was billed: “Press Conference by Permanent Mission of Libya” when Mr. Dabbashi was not acting in the course of his employment and so was not lawfully a member of the “Permanent Mission of Libya”. The UN never disassociated itself from Mr. Dabbashi’s claims, even when its own investigations failed to find evidence of genocide. Moreover, after Mr. Dabbashi’s resignation as the Libyan UN representative, he appears to have been provided with de facto status within the UN, a status devoid of procedural or lawful foundation, until his replacement by the National Transitional Counsel ‘NTC’ representative.
  • The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) provides that states control diplomatic appointments. Commentary on the General Assembly Rules of Procedure, Rule 27 states that a Credentials Committee verifies delegation credentials, ensuring state authorization.[14] This means that only those authorised by their respective state have standing at the UN. Despite there being no lawful basis for the UN to allow an individual, who had ceased to represent the government who had appointed him to the UN, to make a public statement under the aegis of the UN, when genocide is in issue, such niceties can be brushed aside.
  • On March 5 2011 the Libyan government attempted to appoint Mr. Ali Abdussalam Treki as a representative to the United Nations, replacing Mohamed Shalgham, who had defected. Mr. Treki had served as the President of the 64th General Assembly of the UN and served three times as his country’s representative from 1982 to 1984, when he also chaired the General Assembly’s Fourth Committee (Decolonization) and represented Libya on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights; from 1986 to 1990; and most recently in 2003.  Earlier, in 1982, he served as a Vice-President of the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. A veteran in the fields of diplomacy and international relations, Mr. Treki served as Libya’s Ambassador to France from 1995 to 1999, as Permanent Representative to the League of Arab States in Cairo (Egypt) from 1991 to 1994, and as Foreign Minister from 1977 to 1980. Mr. Treki also played a significant role in the creation of the African Union and had been directly involved in mediating several conflicts in Africa, notably in the Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Djibouti-Eritrea, as well as in other parts of the world, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus and the Philippines. Over the course of a career spanning four decades, Mr. Treki led Libya’s delegation to numerous African summits and conferences including ministerial meetings of the former Organization of African Unity and, more recently, of the African Union Executive Council.  In addition, he headed the Libyan delegation to summits and conferences of the League of Arab States and chaired the League’s Council of Ministers from 1976 to 1977.  He also led his country’s delegation to summits and ministerial conferences of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and chaired the Council of Ministers of Islamic States.  He further headed Libya’s delegation to ministerial meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as to the Movement’s 1979 summit conference in Cuba.
  • The request for Mr. Treki’s appointment was communicated by the leader of the Libyan government, to the UN Secretary-General two weeks prior to Resolution 1973, in accordance with UN Rule 27 which provides: “The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General if possible not less than one week before the opening of the session.”[15] The requirement that this nomination be provided “not less than one week before the opening of the session” relates to the session at which the State Party wants the nominated representative to represent it, by default the next session after the one-week “if possible” period required for consideration.
  • The 2011 Credentials Committee comprised of China, Russia and the United States, together in this case with Luxembourg, as the EU representative. As a great power door-keeper, Credential Committee’s deliberations are largely kept secret. Wikileaks has provided some public access to its machinations, such as in regard to Honduras in 2009[16]. There is no publically available record of the Committee’s consideration of Mr. Treki’s application, so it is unknown if in fact it was considered and if so, when. The timing of this is critical, as typically uncontested credentials are approved within weeks during regular sessions[17]. In the case of South Sudan, it took 5 days, on or about July 14, 2011[18]. An application could have been put before the general Assembly in any of the plenary sessions in April[19] and here were numerous plenary sessions prior to September period at which Mr. Treki’s credentialisation could have been put to the General Assembly. As discussed below, the issue of credentialisation of a representative for Libya was only dealt with at the General Assembly ‘GA’ plenary meeting on 16 September 2011. This was in breach of UN Rule 28 which provides:

A Credentials Committee shall be appointed at the beginning of each

session. It shall consist of nine members, who shall be appointed by the

General Assembly on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall

elect its own officers. It shall examine the credentials of representatives

and report without delay.

(emphasis added.)

  • All that appears to be publically available in regard the Libyan nomination process is the Committee’s report[20], of 16 September 2011, which makes no mention of the Treki referral and the discussion of that report at the UN 2nd plenary meeting of 16 September 2011, at which Mr. Al-Nasser Presided[21].  Mr. Al-Nasser was also the Representative of Qatar, the Arab League’s implacable opponent of Libyan oil and Colonel Gaddafi, which committed troops to overthrow him. There is a follow up report of the Committee, but this adds nothing.
  • At the 16 September 2011 meeting of the General Assembly the chair of the Credentials Committee stated:
                   The report lists all those Member States that had, at the time of the Committee’s      meeting on 14 September 2011, submitted formal credentials within the         meaning of rule 27 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.
  • As the process undertaken by Secretary-General Moon and the Credentials Committee is entirely opaque, it is unknown if this statement is false or misleading. It is known that an application for credentialisation of Mr. Treki was made to the Secretary-General. As the Libyan government gave notice to the Secretary-General of its proposed representative pursuant to UN Rule 27, “formal credentials” were submitted. That Mr. Treki’s application was rejected by the Committee did not mean it was not submitted, as implied by the Credential Committee’s claim that its report listed, “all those Member States that had, at the time of the Committee’s meeting on 14 September 2011, submitted formal credentials”. (emphasis added) As raised by the Angolan Representative at the GA meeting of 16 September 2011: “The Committee’s report [A/66/450] lacks transparency… We must ask why alternative credentials [Treki’s] were not considered.” (p. 23)
  • Moreover, this was not a simple matter of uncontroversial credentialisation but at issue was a contested one, which raised the criteria for statehood in a contested setting.

Criteria for statehood

  • The Credential Committee and apparently Secretary-General Moon proceeded as if the NTC merely required to have its application for credentials approved, a generally uncontroversial procedure, when in fact, it required consideration of whether admission as a new state was in issue.
  • The underlying cause of the Libyan government’s delegitimisation by the UN was an insurrectional secessionist movement in Cyrenaica. Moreover, Colonel Gaddafi’s position as leader was largely founded on his balancing of the West and Eastern tribal groupings interests. Once one of these factions had gone its own way, his middle ground position, as he literally hailed from central Sirte, was no longer tenable. As much as the NATO invasion, this is what doomed him. Post this insurrection in the East and until today, there now exists two states, where there once was one. That one names itself after the prior unitary State, does not automatically make it that state, as was in issue in the fall-out of NATO’s dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the claim to that State’s seat in the UN, by contending factions.
  • The criteria for Statehood is that set out in the Montevideo Convention (1933) which defines statehood as meeting the following criteria: (1) permanent population, (2) defined territory, (3) effective government, and (4) capacity to conduct international relations. The issue is not that the NTC could not meet these criteria, but that these criteria could not be assumed in this case, particularly in regard to “defined territory” but also, “(4) capacity to conduct international relations. This latter criteria came into play, depending on when the contending applications were made. Mr. Treki’s application to be recognised as the Libyan government’s UN representative and hence reflect it’s “capacity to conduct international relations” by a veteran diplomat, was made on 5 March 2011. Any late entry of the NTC candidate and the preferential treatment then accorded to its candidate, as discussed below, strongly indicated that at the first plenary session in April it was the Libyan government’s candidate who best met criteria (4).
  • As can be seen, the process by which these criteria could be resolved and subsequently inform any decision by the Security Council and the General Assembly were of a different order to credentualisation of a new representative of a pre-existing State party.  The UN Charter, at Article 18(2) provides that decisions on important questions, including membership, require a two-thirds majority, as set out in the General Assembly Rules of Procedure, Rule 83, whereas Rule 27 credentualisation of a new permanent representative of a pre-existing State party, already in the UN, is determined by simple majority.
  • Again there is the precedent that genocide trumps all and that even foundational rules of the UN can be cast aside in order to mitigate this risk.     

Controversy

  • The nature of conduct of the UN General Assembly session, at which the NTC candidate was approved is indicated by the UN press release title: After Much Wrangling, General Assembly Seats National Transitional Council of Libya as Country’s Representative (September 16, 2011)   This press release details a contentious debate, including opposition from the non-aligned states (e.g., Angola, Nicaragua) who argued the NTC was a NATO-imposed faction, not a legitimate government.  Nicaragua’s representative stating: “The National Transitional Council… is not the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. It is a faction imposed by NATO bombers.” (p. 24-25)[22]
  • This was plainly a controversial issue of the highest order, central to the nature of the UN itself and the tension between the colonialists and the colonialised. For the former to rig the game, by abstracting any reference to the Treki nomination, could be seen as contemptuous distain for the 3rd world in a disputed vote, with 32 nations either voting against recognition of the NTC representative or abstaining. However, it is submitted that the great powers were moved by a higher calling, to spare nothing in order to stamp out the risk of genocide.
  • In attempting to arrive at the extent of measures adopted in the Libyan context, the lack of UN transparency means that there are two possibilities in play:
  • Secretary General Moon did not inform the Credentials Committee of the Libyan government’s nomination of Mr Treki;
  • Despite being informed of the nomination by Secretary Moon, the Credentials Committee breached R27:28 and lied to the General assembly in order to cover up its unlawful conduct. 
  • While this may seem to leave the matter unresolved, together with the USA’s refusal of a visa to Mr Treki, preventing him from advocating for his credentialisation, there is an evidential basis for civil conspiracy. Assuming premise (a) above, the Credentials Committee were put on notice of the Treki nomination, at the latest by Angola’s protest on 16 September 2011. That the Credentials Committee took no steps to rectify the situation or even raise it, suggests it was in fact seized of the nomination. Assuming premise (b) above, Secretary Moon, fixed with knowledge of R27:28 by his office, knew or must have known, after a matter of weeks, that somehow the nomination process had miscarried and was under an obligation to make enquiries, but which given the outcome, could not have been made. In the case of the USA, there is also propensity evidence.
  • The purpose of this submission is not to suggest that Secretary-General Moon, Russia, China, USA and the EU, by its Luxemburgian plenipotentiary, should be tried for conspiracy, but rather that there is an evidential basis that they either independently acted illegally, or entered into a conspiracy to break the UN Rules and the laws of natural justice to deny Libya the right to be heard, in relation to its own fate. As set out above, Mr Treki was a seasoned diplomat with very strong associations with the African Union. His potential, as a UN representative, advocating for the Libyan government and marshalling opposition to military intervention, is demonstrated by the unlawful and deceitful conduct of those who blocked his appointment. Moreover, given his depth of experience in mediating conflict zones, the conflict between West and East Libya might have been resolved. As discussed in ‘UN Security Council Sanctions and Mediation in Libya’ (July 4, 2022),[23]  the UN policy here displayed a dysfunctional ambivalence between mediation and intervention.
  • The key point is again that where there is genocide or real risk of genocide, as crimes against humanity are being committed, even the right to be heard must give way and the Libyan precedent is authority for there being no requirement that Israel be given an opportunity to respond to the Application, as this permits delay and so further genocide or risk of genocide.

Application of Resolutions 1970 & 1973 to the genocide in Gaza

  • While these two resolutions were rolled out as a two-stage strategy, this does not detract from their validity, as all means are valid in the suppression of genocide. As one builds on the other and the latter refers to the former, only relevant parts of Resolution 1973 ‘1973’ most relevant to the current genocide will be set out here. 1973 begins by listing wrongs, indistinguishable from those wrongs with the Court is burdened with in full measure in this application. 1973 refers to: “grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties. This if anything would understate the situation in Gaza. It reiterates the responsibility of State authorities to “protect the population” and reaffirms that “parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians”. Plainly Israel has failed in this obligation. 1973 condemns gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions, all too familiar in the Gaza genocide. 1973 further condemns “acts of violence and intimidation committed by the

Libyan authorities against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel”. None of the UN claims about the Libyan government viewed in preparation for this submission explicitly describe such conduct in Libya, but the murder of literally hundreds of journalists and the like in Gaza is an act un-paralleled in war, deserving of universal condemnation. Similarly, 1973 does not refer to attacks on medical personal. The targeted assassination and mass incarceration of medical personnel by the state of Israeli is inhuman conduct, rarely seen in war and conducted here on a scale never before seen.

  • While superficially Resolution 1973 could be seen as not actually permitting overwhelming military intervention, this was simply legerdermain for public relations purposes. The imposition of a “no fly zone” together with the ability to take “all necessary measures” provided the platform for the action no fly zone, first advocated for at the UN press conference on 21 February 2011.  This predictable outcome was known at the time. Cuban delegate Pedro Núñez Mosquera explicitly warned that military intervention would cause mass civilian deaths (UNSC S/PV.6498, 17 March 2011, pp. 7–8)[24]. His prediction proved accurate: NATO’s campaign killed thousands, including during the siege of Sirte. See also Cuba’s opposition in UNSC Resolution 1973 voting records (S/RES/1973).[25] “Cuba—a small Global South nation—saw through NATO’s ruse in 2011, while powerful states enabled catastrophe. Today, the same states shield Israel. The playbook hasn’t changed.”
  • The bombing commenced on 19 March 2011 and continued despite the Libyan government’s agreement to a ceasefire on 10 April 2011. The slaughter continued at least till the torture and murder of Colonel Gadaffi on 20 October 2011, together with the killing of his son Mutassim and about 67 other members of his convoy on that day. In all this time no challenge was made to the reach of Resolution 1973, by any members of the Security Council.

Bosnia v Serbia

  • While these submissions engage with the precedent created by the UN response to the Libyan situation, this is because of the very proximal analogies that can be drawn to the Application and the situation in Palestine. However, it must not be forgotten that the UN Libyan response is itself patterned on the UN response to NATO’s dismemberment of Yugoslavia and so we are looking at a long term UN policy in regard to State Party’s violent suppression of internal dissent. In Bosnia v. Serbia (2007) the ICJ ruled that Serbia had a positive duty prevent the Srebrenica genocide pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide Convention.

Analogous international condemnation to the ongoing risk of genocide in Gaza

  • Continuing with the analogy with events in Libya in 2011, at the Sixty-fifth General Assembly Plenary 76th Meeting Secretary-General Moon stated that:

“The world has spoken with one voice: we demand an immediate end to the violence against civilians and full respect for their fundamental human rights, including those of peaceful assembly and free speech,” said Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his address to the Assembly.  He welcomed the recommendation of the Human Rights Council to suspend Libya’s membership “so long as the violence continued”.

  • Mr. Ban also commended the Security Council’s decision over the weekend to refer the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, and called for the urgent dispatching of an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate alleged violations of international human rights in the country, in line with the Human Rights Council’s recommendation.[26] 
  • SUSAN RICE (United States) said the unprecedented suspension of Libya from the Human Rights Council was a “harsh rebuke, but one that Libya’s leaders had brought down upon themselves”.  She said the United States continued to be appalled by the situation in Libya.  “This action sends another clear warning to Mr. Qadhafi and those who stand by him: they must stop the killing.”  The General Assembly had come together “to speak with one voice to Libya’s unrepentant rulers”.  When the only way that a leader could cling to power was to violate the human rights of his own people, he had lost all legitimacy to rule.  “He must go, and he must go now,” she said.
  • TSUNEO NISHIDA (Japan) said his delegation was deeply concerned about the “gross and systematic violations of human rights” currently being committed by the Libyan Government, and had co-sponsored the resolution to suspend Libya’s membership in the Human Rights Council. 
  • CHRISTIAN WENAWESER (Liechtenstein), welcoming the Assembly’s action, voiced grave concern at the possibility that crimes against humanity were being committed in Libya “at this very moment”.
  • GARY FRANCIS QUINLAN (Australia) said the gross human rights violations in Libya warranted that country’s suspension from Human Rights Council.  It was untenable that “a regime so clearly failing in its responsibility” would be fit to serve on such a United Nations body.
  • JIM MCLAY (New Zealand) expressed his condolences to the victims’ families.  The Libyan regime’s systematic use of force evoked memories of the actions of other tyrants.  That use of force could constitute crimes against humanity.  “No regime has the right to turn its own country and the lives of its own people into a living hell,”.
  • Plainly all these statements apply a fortiori to Israel in the present circumstances and to its Leader Mr. Netanyahoo.

Legal principles

  • As set out above, it was the real risk of genocide in Libya which validated the destruction of the Libyan government, by massive military intervention. Plainly the Court has no such executive power. However, it is submitted that this precedent provides that the real risk of genocide, arising from ongoing crimes against humanity, calls for the most extreme sanction. As submitted below, the most extreme sanction the Court can impose is to find that as Israel has persistently violated the Principles contained in the UN Charter, the Security Council should recommend to the General Assembly, that Israel be expelled from the UN for breach of Chapter II Article 6. This is not an empty gesture, as comity obliges proportionate consideration by the Security Council, which functions as the executive within the UN constitutional framework. Moreover, on the authority of the Libyan precedent, Israel has by its own conduct, forgone the right to be heard.
  • The submissions set out above demonstrate a binding legal precedent, which demands parity of action. The most fundamental principle of law is equality before the law and without this principle there is no law. As such it forms a central part of the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, as follows: “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” There is no law for Serbia and another for Israel, there is no law for Libya and another for Israel. Precedent and parity are expressions of this fundamental principle. Justice must be blind and the scales evenly balanced, without this we have no law.
  • The critical feature of this precedent is that it is not genocide, but real risk of genocide, on the basis of evidence of crimes against humanity, that triggers ultimate sanction.
  • The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides:

Article VIII

Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

  • The UN Charter, Chapter II Article 6 provides:

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

  • The state of Israel has violated “Principles contained in the present Charter” such as the principle of “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small” since the Nakba. Putting aside all the violation from then to current times, this Application was filed on 29 December 2023 and has since been joined by a host of nations. While under the purview of this Court, in contumelious disregard for the Court’s acceptance of the Application, even on a prima facie basis, together with the concerns of leading members of the Secretariat and foundational organs of the UN, the state of Israel has persistently continued in its violations, unabated, despite the cumulative damage of its actions.
  • It is submitted that the above submissions, when considered together with the evidence provided by those supporting the Application, ground the following premises:
  • In both the Yugoslavian and Libyan theatres, when insurrectionary succession movements arose, the UN adopted a policy of preventing further crimes against humanity, being committed against such insurrectionaries, by either sanctioning or sponsoring overwhelming military intervention, directed against the State Party engaged in crimes against humanity;
  • In Libya the use of overwhelming military intervention to counter genocide was a key driver, from its UN endorsed articulation by Mr. Dabbashi to Resolutions 1970 & 1973;
  • In this application genocide is asserted, as is the application of Article IX of the Genocide Convention;
  • The crimes against humanity which have triggered the UN sponsoring of overwhelming military intervention are systemic acts of violence against non-combatant civilians;
  • The catalogued crimes against humanity and other war crimes which in Libya precipitated the sponsoring of overwhelming military intervention are vastly overmatched by the same crimes against humanity and other war crimes which have been committed by Israel against the civilian population of Gaza;
  • The period for which such crimes have been allowed to continue in Gaza, is vastly longer than that which pertained in Libya.
  • The vast disparity between the extent of crimes against humanity committed by the government of Libya and those committed and continuing to be committed by the government of Israel leaves no room for nuance or doubt. The evidence screams at you and is heard by the whole world.
  • There is an alternative premise that can be derived from these submissions. Secretary-General Guterre’s role in the destruction of the Libyan government and the dismemberment of Libya in 2011 compares badly with his failure to take comparable steps in regard to Israel. This demonstrates that the Secretary-General is two-faced, to the point of fraud, or has failed the UN in its first objective, which seems to be needed to be recalled:

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind …

  • The Preamble to the United Nations Charter continues to state that the purpose of the United Nations is “to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest. There is no common interest in armies butchering children. Again we are reduced to failing back on the most basic tenets of civilization. While it could be argued that the power of the UN is sequestered by the Security Council, in comparable entities to the UN, ministers of parliaments and leaders with integrity choose resignation over dishonor. How would the Security Council look if the Secretary General and all the high ranking officers of the Secretariat walked out? That hasn’t happened, so are we left with a zombie organization that moves only tectonically, by continental grift?
  •  Meanwhile, the General Assembly is a trance, hypnotised by awards of honorifics and other geegaws, it has succumbed to the veto power of the Security Council, itself a collection of walruses and carpenters. This thieves’ kitchen figures here twice, once in its Credentials Committee short form, duping the General Assembly by concealing the Libyan government’s attempt to regularize its formal standing with the UN and again in its long form, duping the world with its “no fly-zone” that devastated cities and brought death from the air to so many. And so the UN follows the League of Nations, as a failed project and for the same reasons.
  • In this tragic situation, it falls to the ICJ to uphold the principles it and the UN were founded on. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer[27]  an emergency powers case heard during the Korean war, Supreme Court Justice Jackson, who had been the lead US counsel to the Nuremberg Tribunal, struck a note of foreboding, warning:

Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity. Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power that do not show on the face of the Constitution.[28]

  • But it is Justice Jackson’s final words that are most chilling. Speaking of the US Constitution, he wrote:

Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.[29] 

  • After the failure of the General Assembly and the Secretariat, that is the duty of the ICJ,  to hold fast to the basic norms the UN was founded on and to hold genocidal States to account. The UN Charter Chapter II Article 6 provides:

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

  • The Court has no executive power, but it has a moral suasion. Israeli has “persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter”. It is time for the ICJ to speak truth to power, or shut itself down. The only thing worse than lack of justice, is a façade of justice.

16 May 2025

______________

G E Minchin

counsel


[1] https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2011/2/4d63f0b39/unhcr-responds-libya-crisis.html

[2] https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/110221_Libya.doc.htm

[3] https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-crisis-situation-report-no-1

[4] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2011/02/pillay-calls-international-inquiry-libyan-violence-and- justice-victims

[5] https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2011/2/4d66a7b29/unhcr-calls-safe-passage-libya.html

[6] https://undocs.org/A/HRC/S-15/1

[7] https://undocs.org/S/RES/1970(2011)

[8] https://web.archive.org/web/20150912040003/https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/bio412

[9] https://web.archive.org/web/20110308005950/https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE72400H

[10] https://undocs.org/S/RES/1973(2011)

[11] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/4/10/au-team-arrives-in-libya-to-push-for-ceasefire

[12] https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/ga11047.doc.htm (Archived here)

[13] https://undocs.org/A/66/450

[14] https://undocs.org/A/66/PV.7

[15] http://www.cubaminrex.cu/en/cuba-reiterates-opposition-foreign-intervention-libya

[16] https://undocs.org/A/520/Rev.20

[17] https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09UNNEWYORK639_a.html

[18] https://undocs.org/A/RES/65/308

[19] https://press.un.org/en/2011/ga11137.doc.htm

[20] https://www.icj-cij.org/case/91

[21] https://undocs.org/S/PV.6498

[22] https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13450.doc.htm

[23] https://brill.com/view/journals/gg/28/3/article-p383_383.xml

[24] UN Press Release GA/11047 (archived here).

[25] S/RES/1973

[26] Press Release SC/10187.)

[27] 343 U.S. 579 (1952). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/343/579/

[28] Ibid 653.

[29] Ibid 655.

REGINA v DUDLEY & STEPHENS

ANATOMY OF A SHOW TRIAL

At the centre of Dudley & Stephens is the defence of necessity and its place in a criminal law built on volitional conduct. At Roman law the defence arose first from the facts but was then contingent on the drawing of lots. This second feature did not find favour with St Thomas Aquinas, who deleted it when he wrote the defence of necessity into Church law. From Church law the defence passed into common law, again sans lot, but it was anomalous in regard to kindred defences, in that it was absolute. The English Court in Dudley & Stephens was right to have seen this anomaly as being in need of correction but instead of correcting this in a practical manner, and manipulated the case so that a pronouncement of Victorian morality could be made. This was a prime example of Arnold’s observation that: “in the public trial we find the government speaking ex cathedra”.

CONTENTS

1          Introduction

2          The Transition of the Defence of Necessity from Roman to

Common Law

3          US v Holmes

4          Dudley & Stephens: The Customary Law Context

5          Dudley & Stephens: The Facts

6          Dudley & Stephens as a Show Trial

7          Before the Exeter Assize Court

8          Before the Queen’s Bench

9          The Reasons of the Court

10        The Great Example

11        Conclusion

1. Introduction

Dudley & Stephens is the quintessential criminal case in the common law pantheon because at its centre is the question of what constitutes volitional behaviour. In Dudley & Stephens volitional behaviour is pitched against necessity and the contest between these factors have generated an enormous amount of legal writing, as exampled above. Having been such a focus of attention for so long, it might be wondered what further could be said about this case.

The research approach in this paper is to track the historical articulation of the defence of necessity and to demonstrate how its truncation, by the deletion of the use of the lot, created an anomaly in English law. The methodology adopted here is to address the following issues in order to demonstrate the thesis that the original defence, which utilised selection by lot, was a valid rule in extremis, as found in US v Holmes but that without the lot, the law is reduced to impractical demands, as it was in Dudley & Stephens. It is also argued that Dudley & Stephens was in essence a political show trial, which upheld the moral order of Victorian England:

1) That the defence of necessity had been initially subject to the drawing of lots, in Roman law and perhaps previously. When St Thomas Aquinas incorporated this defence into canon law he dropped the drawing of lots as an element of the defence, arguably because he saw it as an appeal to fate and so was un-Godly. The defence then passed into common law, sans lot, but it was an anomaly and the Court in Dudley v Stephens was correct to see it as so.

2) In US v Holmes it had been held that the drawing of lots was appropriate in extremis. The English Court, an aristocratic body, could not abide anything so democratic as the lot and saw Dudley & Stephens as an opportunity to refute the reasoning in US v Holmes.

3) One of the central features of Dudley & Stephens was the “special verdict”, by which the jury abrogated their duty to give a verdict and the Court usurped this function. Similarly, the Judgment is one of the final touches in the English aristocracy’s obliteration of the commoner’s control of customary law. The vehicle for the destruction of customary law was legislation by Parliament. Parliament had been an institution almost entirely under aristocratic control but by the time of Dudley & Stephens and the growth of suffrage, the certainty of this power base was in question. In Dudley & Stephens the English lords were pitching for ideological control sanctioned by a legal system which was firmly in their control. As such Dudley & Stephens is not in essence a criminal case, it is a political case and a show trial at that.

2. The Transition of the Defence of Necessity from Roman to
Common Law

The conflict in criminal law between wilfulness and compulsion has long taxed legal thinkers. The Plank dilemma, that is the moral dilemma of two drowning men struggling over a plank that will only support one of them, is ascribed to various philosophers around the second century B.C, including the Greek, Carneades of Cyrene. Another supposed source, the Roman Stoic Hecaton, though that the solution was to draw lots. Fate was then the arbiter and the right was with whom fate favoured. In Roman law the defence of necessity was treated “casuistically” or case by case (Ghanayam, 2006). If this is correct then clearly the defence was available to the Roman jurists. Within classical Roman society hard choices, such as who would pay the price in a decimation, were typically decided by lot. In myth the three brothers, Zeus, Poseidon and Hades cast lots to see which kingdom they would have, the sky, the sea or the underworld.

St. Thomas Aquinas, one of whose great projects was the incorporation of Roman law into Church law, adopted the defence into Church law as a special case saying that “necessity knows no law”. Aquinas was first a Churchman, for whom the interrelationship between free will and Providence was central. Accordingly, he was uncomfortable with the pagan element of the casting of lots, as the core mechanism in the Roman defence of necessity and so expunged it. In Aquinas’ cosmos Providence does not share the stage with the three sisters and so he could not admit the jurisdiction of the fates and the validity of the casting of lots. This meant that the defence passed into Canon law bereft of its central and validating element, the casting of lots.

Aquinas’s approach also found favour with influential casuists such Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf who extended the defence of necessity, for conservation of life, to the justification of larceny in the circumstance of starvation.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in his The Elements of the Common Lawes of England also known as his Maxims of the Law includes a three- fold defence of necessity, “conservation of life”, “necessity of obedience” and “necessity of the act of God or of a stranger”. As an example of conservation of life, Bacon refers explicitly to the plank dilemma and it is Aquinas’s necessity, without the Roman lot, that Bacon is referencing, stating that it “is neither se defendendo nor by misadventure, but justifiable”2. Bacon further said that “the chargeth no man with default where the act is compulsorie, … [and that] … such necessity carrieth a priviledge in it selfe”3.

Bacon’s proposition is that the law does not apply where there is“so great a perturbation of the judgement and reason as in presumption of law man’s nature cannot overcome”. In particular when Bacon says the action is justified and “carrieth a priviledge in it selfe”, he placed it above self-defence and negligent misadventure, both of which, at the time, operated as mere excuse and an excuse that was outside the law, vesting only in a royal pardon4. This created an anomaly. It also runs into the difficulty that the presumption of volition is a founding premise of English criminal law, which sets the scope of enquiry within the judicial system, at a practical and pragmatic level.

Matthew Hale (1609-1676) in his Pleas of the Crown took a different approach to Bacon as he saw self-defence as legitimate necessity, stating that “the law permits him in his own defence to kill the assailant, for by the violence of the assault, and the offence committed upon him by the assailant himself, the law of nature, and necessity, hath made him his own protector”5. However he balked at the priority of the defence of necessity stating that even if the only escape from peril of death is to kill an innocent this is still murder. Hale also refuted the casuists Grotius and Pufendorf’s extension of the necessity of conservation of life, to the justification of theft in the circumstance of starvation, as discussed below, but nowhere did Hale directly discuss the plank dilemma.

William Blackstone (1723-1780), in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, set out his views on wilfulness and compulsion as follows:

[a]s punishments are only inflicted for the abuse of free will, which God has given to man, it is just that a man should be excused for those acts which are done through unavoidable force of compulsion … [and]

Choice between two evils … when a man has a choice of two evils set before him and chooses the less pernicious one. He rejects the greater evil set before him and chooses the less pernicious one6.

When addressing the Plank dilemma Blackstone adopted Bacon’s defence of necessity but attempted to reconcile it with Hales’ position, by basing the defence of necessity on self-defence, saying:

2The Elements of the Common Lawes of England. 3Ibid. 4Finkelstein. Two Men and a Plank, Legal Theory 7 (2001) 279-306. 280 Note 5. 5Hale The History of the Pleas of the Crown Vol. 1. p51. 6Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England, 186. 7Ibid.

… since their both remaining on the same weak plank is a mutual, though innocent, attempt upon, and an endangerment of, each other’s life7.

Blackstone was a great jurist but it is difficult to see how the passive act of clinging to a plank can constitute any attempt upon another, known to criminal law. To advance such a proposition takes us beyond the province of criminal law and into the sphere of morality. The result of this line of reasoning in the common law was to create a “state of nature” exception to the law which was anomalous and a legal terra nullius.

Despite this being the common position in England, the Roman defence of necessity, as it pertained to its core dilemma, that of the Plank or like watery tribulations, arguably continued to apply in regard to the facts in Dudley & Stephens. In AWB Simpson’s in depth study of Dudley & Stephens, Cannibalism and the Common Law Simpson sets out what he describes as the “only sustained technical criticism”8, of the case. This, Simpson says was Sir G S Baker’s argument that jurisdiction over acts on the high sea were originally held by the Courts of Admiralty “which applied not the common law of England but a body of law of international character based upon Roman law or ‘civil’ law as it is technically called”9. While the Courts of Admiralty no longer existed, “Baker argued that this transfer of jurisdiction did not alter the fact that the appropriate law to be applied was civil not common law”10. Sir G S Baker said that Chief Justice Mansfield had explicitly ruled in R v Depardo (1807)11 that the Admiralty applied civil law and maritime customs. Baker argued that: “the practice … of casting lots … maybe …, [was] one of the consuetudines marinae spoken of by Lord Mansfield”12.

8Simpson 1986: p. 248. 9Ibid 249. 10Ibid. 11Taunton, 26. [1]2Op cit. [1]3Op cit. [1]4Op cit. [1]5Dudley & Stephens 273.

Baker also drew upon Everad Otto, a commentator on Pufendorf, who said in regard to the defence of necessity, “therefore the judgement of the lot will be necessary, as in the history of Jonah”13. This reference Otto derives from the Book of Jonah (ch.1 v 7) which relates to when Jonah was travelling by sea from Joppa to Tarshish, in spite of God’s direction. God sent a storm against the ship Jonah was travelling on. The seamen drew lots to see who was responsible for the storm and the lot fell on Jonah. Baker concludes that, “Joppa being on the Syrian coast and comparatively close to Rhodes, this maritime custom might very possibly be of Rhodian origin. This, if certain, would be a very curious fact since the Rhodian sea-laws are a part of Admiralty law”14. None of these arguments were ever made or referred to in Dudley & Stephens although in stating the indictment the Court noted that the crime was “within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty”15.

3. US v Holmes

After the American ship the William Brown sank in 1841, numerous survivors were crowded aboard a lifeboat. Claiming that the boat was overloaded and in peril of capsizing, the seamen aboard jettisoned 16 male passengers. Of the seaman one Alexander Holmes was subsequently charged with manslaughter. Significantly the ship’s Mate had raised the issue of drawing lots with Holmes and others before taking to another lifeboat. Further the passenger whom Holmes was charged with killing, Francis Askin, appealed to Holmes saying “if God dont send us some help, well draw lots, and if the lot falls on me, Ill go over like a man16. Holmes’ did not accept Askin’s plea. Holmes defence was that jettisoning Askin was a necessity to keep the lifeboat afloat in the heavy seas and that as the seamen were required to man the boat, those jettisoned had to be the passengers, though it was a case of gentlemen before ladies. As a matter of fact, the Court found that not all the seamen in the boat were needed to man it.

Justice Baldwin of the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania also observed that:

When the ship is in no danger of sinking, but all sustenance is exhausted, and a sacrifice of one person is necessary to appease the hunger of others, the selection is by lot. This mode is resorted to as the fairest mode, and, in some sort, as an appeal to God, for selection of the victim.

… If time have existed to cast lots, and to select the victims, then, as we have said, sortition should be adopted. In no other than this or some like way are those having equal rights put upon an equal footing, and in no other way is it possible to guard against partiality and oppression, violence and conflict17.

In sentencing Holmes to 6 month’s imprisonment, on top of some month’s remand in custody and a fine of $20, Baldwin J. held that “the seamen, beyond the number necessary to navigate the boat, in no circumstances can claim exemption from the common lot of the passengers”18.

4. Dudley & Stephens: The Customary Law Context

[1]6Holmes 4. [1]7Ibid 14. [1]8Ibid 1. [1]9Cannibalism and the Common Law: 98. 20Ibid 118.

Britannia may have ruled the waves but it was not a one sided contest. In the year of Dudley & Stephens, 1884-85, 561 British registered vessels were lost and death (by all causes) of crew and passengers was 425919. As a subset of tragedy at sea, the deprivations of the shipwrecked and instances of cannibalism amongst survivors received particular attention by the media and the public. To the modern mind cannibalism is an almost fantastical relic of the distant past but cannibalism was far from being unknown amongst ship-wrecked English seamen in the 19th century. While in most instances the dead were consumed, in extreme circumstances it was the customary practice to draw lots to select a victim.As set out below,customary practice, while open to criticism as being self-serving, was rationalised by a pragmatism which could be described as utilitarian.

Privations after shipwreck were exacerbated by the fact that seamen were notoriously underfed. In the case of the wreck of the England, a passing ship, the Lord Melville, would not take survivors as they had no provisions themselves20. In 1807 survivors of the Nautilus ate those who died so soon after the shipwreck, that it was “quite extraordinary”21. The sinking of the Medusa in 1816, which inspired Gericault’s Rideau de laMedusa”, gave rise to cannibalism after 3 days and the jettisoning of sick survivors after 6 days. Of the 150 abandoned on a raft only 15 survived to be rescued, 15 days after the sinking22.

In 1835 the Francis Spaight capsized, leaving the survivors without food or water in a dis-masted and swamped wreck. On the sixteenth day after the capsizing the Captain decreed that lots should be drawn between the Captain decreed that lots should be drawn between the cabin boys, as their loss was less than “those who had wives and children depending on them”23. The lot was said to have fallen on one Patrick O’Brien who was killed and his blood drunk by the crew24. The Francis Spaight was referred to in Parliamentary Select Committee reports in 1836 and 1839 but no one was ever charged with the killing of Patrick O’Brien, and “the only legal proceedings to arise out of the death”25 was for the Limerick magistrates to bind the boy’s mother over to keep the peace, following complaints of harassment from the captain.

21Ibid116. 22Ibid. 23Ibid 131. 24Ibid. 25Ibid 135. 26Ibid 176-193. 27Ibid 192.

As discussed above, it was the sinking of the William Brown in 1841 and the American Court’s observations in Holmes in regard to the drawing of lots, which arguably lay behind the decision by senior figures in the English establishment to make an example of an act of cannibalism. Following the sinking of the Euxine in 1874 and an act of cannibalism on the part of survivors, not denied, an attempt was made to bring a prosecution for the murder and cannibalism in Regina v Archer and Muller26. The case foundered for a variety of reasons, one perhaps being that it coincided with Samuel Plimsoll’s campaign, in which he had just been suspended from Parliament for an outburst against Edward Bates, the owner of the Euxine. AWB Simpson, drawing an inference from the fact that it was the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for State who conveyed the decision not to proceed with a prosecution, says that the “crew of a ship owned by a prominent Conservative ship owner, himself notorious among seamen for staving his crews, had actually been reduced to eating each other … would hardly have been politically welcomed”27.

5. Dudley & Stephens: The Facts

Captain Tom Dudley, a professional sailing captain who plied the racing and cruising trade of England’s channel ports, was engaged to deliver the yacht Mignonette to Sydney, Australia. Dudley hired a crew of three, mate Edwin Stephens, seaman Edmond Brooks and cabin boy Richard Parker. Shipwrecked by a storm in the South Atlantic, the crew managed to take to the lifeboat but 2000 miles from land, with no sail, no water and only two pounds of turnips for provisions, their situation was dire. After 15 days in the open boat Dudley broached the topic of drawing lots to decide who would be sacrificed for the others, but was opposed by Brooks, who was the strongest of them all. Two days later, their strength ebbing, Dudley again raised the drawing of lots but he was again contradicted by Brooks. Dudley conferred with Stephens, stating that he believed the boy, 17-year-old Parker, was dying. Dudley related that Stephens and he had wives and families’ dependent upon them. Twenty days after being shipwrecked Dudley slew Richard Parker by bleeding him and the three survivors drank his blood and fed off his body. Later Dudley said “the lad dying before our eyes, the longing for his blood came upon us”28. They were rescued four days later by a passing ship.

When landed at Falmouth Harbour Dudley made a full and frank statement of the events to the Board of Trade, as required by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 and an amending Act of 1876. Subsequently interviewed by Sergeant Laverty of the Harbour Police, who had heard of the death of Parker, Dudley freely admitted that he had killed Parker and surrendered the pocket knife with which he had killed and bled the boy, although he asked for its return as a memento of the fateful voyage. Initially public opinion was against the surviving crew on account of the failure to apply the customary practice of drawing lots. When the full story became known, including Dudley’s attempts to cast lots, public opinion in the maritime port swung over “entirely on the side of Dudley and his men”29. There was not a lot of support for a prosecution and the governing body, the Board of Trade, “telegraphed that no action should be taken”30. However, on the orders of the Home Secretary, the Registrar General of Shipping requested that the Treasury solicitors charge the survivors with the murder of Richard Parker.

6. Dudley & Stephens as a Show Trial

Show trials are managed events and so are run from the top. In Dudley & Stephens whereas the governing body was the Board of Trade it was the Home Secretary who determined that charges would be laid31. Once the charges had been laid before the Falmouth magistrates the Attorney-General directed the crown prosecution and set out the crown’s strategy, which was to seek a conviction for murder but for there to be clemency. Clemency was signalled at the outset by the crown not opposing bail, which was extremely unusual in a capital case, where a conviction entailed the mandatory death penalty.

28Ibid. 64. 29Ibid 84. 30Ibid 8. 31Ibid 89.

Despite having a full confession from Dudley no evidence was offered against Brooks, in order for him to be available as a prosecution witness. Brooks was then cast as the hero of the piece, despite his complicity, at least after the fact. His deposition before the Falmouth magistrates was either lost or suppressed. In show trials nothing is left to chance and individual culpability is irrelevant.

The function of show trials is to be defining and authoritative, so they must be conducted at the highest level of the Court. Here the normal process presented a problem, as capital cases were heard by a jury. This caused two difficulties. A not guilty decision was fatal as retrials were unheard of then and even if called for, the unanimity that a show trial required would be lost. A guilty finding was almost as bad, as with a guilty finding there was no binding precedent created, it would be

simply a finding on the facts, distinguishable from other fact scenarios.

There was one way of circumventing the jury making a decision and putting the issue before a superior Court, which was by the jury returning a “special verdict”.

The trial Judge selected by Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, was Baron Huddleston. Simpson claims that it was “highly probable that some careful thought was given to this appointment by the Lord Chief Justice” as Baron Huddleston “had a reputation

for getting his own way with juries”32. This view draws support from the manner in which Baron Huddleston conducted the case, which appears to have had the goal of achieving a special verdict from the outset.

7. Before the Exeter Assize Court

Presiding over the grand jury prior to hearing the facts or the defence submissions, Huddleston gave a formal ruling on the law of necessity concluding with the remark that, “I know no such law”33. Referring to US v Holmes Huddleston held that the casting of lots would “verge on the blasphemous”34 and enhanced the premeditation of the offence. Later, to the same jury convened for the criminal trial, Baron Huddleston stated:

“I shall lay down as a matter of law that there was no justification. I shall lay that down distinctly and absolutely”35.

By denying that necessity provided any justification for Dudley and Stephens’ actions, Huddleston put the jury in an invidious position, and he left them in no doubt as to what that position was saying:

If I was to direct you to give your verdict, I should have to tell you, and you would be bound to obey me, that you must return a verdict of guilty of wilful murder36.

32Ibid 198. 33Ibid 201. 34Ibid. 35Ibid 207. 36Ibid 212 per Huddleston, B. 37Leach Crown Cases 368.

As Huddleston’s stance could have appeared manifestly unfair to the jury, he told them that they could find a “special verdict” on the facts, in which case the issue would be decided by a higher Court. This was an obsolete procedure last performed 100 years previously, in Hazels Case (1785)37, but one which had not been abolished. Importantly such a step put the case before a High Court, thence establishing a binding precedent.

Thinking that they only had the choice of finding Dudley and Stephens guilty of murder, a capital offence punishable only by the death sentence, or giving a “special verdict” the jury chose the latter. Thoughtfully Huddleston had a draft of the special verdict ready for them, which they proceeded to assent to, paragraph by paragraph. The jury did however insert two observations into the verdict. First, that “Richard Parker was likely to die first”38 and secondly that “they would have died if they had not had his body to feed off”39. Huddleston transcribed the latter statement as “that if the men had not feed of the body of the boy they would probably not survived”40 (emphasis added). The jury meekly assented to this modification but it was precisely these qualifications, the juries “likely”, compounded by Huddleston’s “probably”, that Lord Chief Justice Coleridge repeated twice in his Judgment, to underscore the lack of any necessity to kill Parker.

If the case was to effect a denial of the doctrine of necessity it was essential to avoid any conclusion that anyone had to be sacrificed. This was essentially a question of fact, to be determined by the jury. If the jury concluded that in fact survival was dependant on the sacrifice of someone, any statement of the court, that as a matter of law there was no defence of necessity, would be robbed of the power of unanimity. Huddleston resolved this problem by rephrasing the issue as, “was there any necessity of taking the boy rather than drawing lots. I should think you would consider no. Thereof I propose to add this …. Assuming any necessity to kill anybody there was no greater necessity for killing the boy than any of the other three men”41. Here Huddleston deviously made out he agreed with the casting of lots but his formulation sidestepped this issue of lots and tied necessity to the selection of Parker. This tailoring of the issues to the facts did not prevent Huddleston or the Chief Justice from pronouncing broadly on the defence of necessity.

38Ibid 214. 39Ibid 40Ibid. 41Ibid 215. 42Ibid.

Huddleston’s draft also included an unsolicited plea of forgiveness on behalf of the accused. While obvious to counsel, the jury would not have known that a plea of forgiveness by the accused would effectively negate any plea of insanity. The jury did request that their compassion towards the accused be recorded, which was recorded with in a fashion that did not too obviously demonstrate the absurdity of recommending mercy to the still innocent, there having been no verdict.

Huddleston’s partisan approach was also demonstrated by his rewriting the record to fit the prosecution case. The official assented record simply described the Mignonette as a “yacht” and stated that the crew had been forced “to put into an open boat”42. When the defence raised the issue of whether the Court had jurisdiction over an open boat on the high seas Huddleston’s solution was simply to substitute “a registered English vessel”43 for “yacht” while the “open boat” became a “dinghy belonging to the said vessel”44. This was an important point as there was a real issue of jurisdiction at large.

In Arthur Collins QC, Dudley and Stephens’ defence fund had acquired the services of a most experienced advocate. However, Collins’ conduct only makes sense if he had been given very clear messages of prospective clemency from the beginning. This indication, coupled with the Court’s absolute refusal to take any cognisance of the defence of necessity, left Collins with very little room to move, if he were to act in the best interests of his clients. Tellingly Collins’ defence was marked by a number of lapses. Collins never developed an argument that the circumstances were such as would reasonably reduce the crime to one of manslaughter45. Nor did he raise the question of malice, which is central to the definition of murder. The question of temporary insanity was never put to the Court. In view of the highly irregular proceedings, a QC of Collins’ calibre arguably could have frustrated the trial on technical grounds. Forceful judges holding court can intimidate most juries but it is the role of counsel and particularly senior counsel, to match up when such pressures are being exerted. Most significantly Collins never told the jury that they could reject Huddleston’s choice of a finding of guilty or a special verdict and make their own determination. In his defence summation Collins did make an appeal to the inevitable necessity forced upon the seamen and to the absence of precedential punishment for such acts. Huddleston, irritated at this “unauthorised appeal” told the jury that they “were not at liberty to disregard his ruling”46.

It appears that Collins decided that it was in his clients’ best interests not to antagonise the crown, but to rely upon the broad hints of clemency, which could have only been agreed to at the top. It is also significant that Collins was at the time of the trial seeking official preferment and the following year he was knighted and appointed Chief Justice of Madras”47.

43Ibid. 44Ibid. 45Op cit 207. 46Ibid 212. 47Ibid 240.

Huddleston had skilfully created the occasion for a leading case, attended by the full panoply of the law, but exactly how this was to be consummated was problematic. Huddleston probably envisaged that the case would be moved to the Court of Crown Cases Reserved, by the old process of certiorari, for determination, and then return to the Assize Court for sentencing. This failed to factor the effect of the Judicature Acts of 1873, 1875 and 1881, which had greatly changed this procedure, amalgamating the formerly distinct Assize Court into the new overarching High Court of Justice. Under the new procedure cases could only be heard upon conviction by the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. The Attorney General then proposed that the Cornwall Assize Court be increased in size to three judges and be moved to London. However, this mechanism soon ran into difficulties. It was discovered that the Judicature Act of 1873 transferred jurisdiction of such cases to the Queen’s Bench Division and so finally it was resolved to have the case heard before five judges of this august body. It was however clearly stated in the Act that the divisional courts “should consist at most of two or three judges”48 this inconvenient requirement being resolutely ignored.

8. Before the Queen’s Bench

The Attorney General, for the prosecution, argued that the only justification for taking the life of another was one of self-defence and submitted that “there was no authority or precedent in favour of the claim that an innocent person could be lawfully killed by another to save the latter’s life”49. The Lord Chief Justice called upon the defence to refute this “very strong impression in our minds”50. Arthur Collins QC was told to address only the issue of murder, the issue of manslaughter being peremptorily ruled out despite the special verdict leaving manslaughter as a potential outcome.

48Ibid 223. 49Ibid 229. 50Ibid 276. 51Ibid 227. 52Leach Crown Cases 242. 53supra at note 41. 549 Co. Rep. 65b. 552 Ld. Raymond 1485. 56Simpson 227. 57Ibid 228. 58Ibid.

In his opening submissions Collins raised a key issue. The special verdict, as originally transcribed before Huddleston and as evidenced by the original verbatim transcript concluded with the words: “But whether upon the whole matter the prisoners were or are guilty of murder the Jury are ignorant and refer to the court”51. This was the formula used in Rex v Pedly52 and Rex v Hazel53 but such a formula surrendered to the judges the jury’s right to determine guilt or innocence. In the precedent cases of Rex v Mackalley54 and Rex v Oneby55 this issue had been resolved by making a verdict conditional, stated as “Whether this is murder or manslaughter the jury pray the advice of the court and find accordingly”56. Collins pointed out that the original formulation, as transcribed before Huddleston, had been removed and wording conforming to the legally correct formulation substituted, This rewriting of the record was held by the Queen’s Bench to be merely “a clerical matter”57 and was passed over. This was despite the fact that Rex v Mackalley and Rex v Oneby provided that in the absence of a conditional finding the trial proceedings were void as the jury had not performed its function, as Collins stated: “unless there was a finding the judges would give the verdict”58.

Collins’ primary submission was that the defence of necessity applied to the facts and that this defence justified or excused the killing. Collins maintained four bases for his defence of necessity:

1) that the English court should follow US v Holmes;

2) the “state of nature” thesis; that the men’s actions were not voluntary;

3) that the Utilitarian principle that actions are right if they tend towards the greatest possible happiness should be followed and that this meant that those with dependants should have priority over those that didn’t;

4) and as mitigation, that the killing should be excused because of the overwhelming pressure of circumstance.

The court took only a few moments to reject the defence stating “we are all of the opinion that the conviction should be affirmed”59. US v Holmes was rejected in principle and as not being binding on an English court. The state of nature thesis was rejected outright and Collins’ attempt to argue involuntariness foundered on the deliberate nature of the act. The Queen’s Bench could not see how Utilitarianism, given the assumption of human equality, could select who could be killed for the benefit of others. Collins was hampered by the absence of any formal selection by lot but given the Court’s antipathy to the “custom of the sea” it is doubtful if the Court’s attitude would have been any different had such selection taken place. As for mitigating circumstances the traditional view of the Court is that such factors can only mitigate punishment but in a capital case the Court could only impose the penalty of death. Questions of mercy are outside the prerogative of the court and reside with the executive. It was the Court’s view that “it is just when temptations are strongest and the difficulties of self-control most acute that the law should reinforce the individual conscience with the threat of punishment”60.

9. The Reasons of the Court

In setting out the reasons of the court, Lord Coleridge’s first referred to the special verdict, stating:

The jury returned a special verdict, the legal effect of which has been argued before us61.

59Ibid 236. 60Ibid 234. 61Dudley & Stephens para 1. 62Op cit. 228.

In fact, the special verdict was a fait accompli, the only aspect being raised by Collins was its rewording, which had been brushed of as a technicality. Mr Justice Grove, alone of the bench, was concerned about taking over the role of the jury but even he considered the matter “pure form, almost a clerical matter”62. The issue of jurisdiction returned to haunt the court once judgement had been given and particularly Justice Denman, who was unsure of the meaning of the word “Judgment” in this context. If it was a pronouncement of sentence, then where was the verdict, if it was a verdict, then Collins was correct when he claimed that the court had taken over the role of the jury.

Lord Coleridge’s first concern was to validate the jury’s abrogation of its role in succumbing to Huddleston’s pressure to seek a special verdict. He did this by describing this as an act of “cold precision”63. This was a case in which there was a full and frank confession and a prosecution eyewitness. Neither manslaughter or temporary insanity was ever put before the Jury and the one live issue, necessity, the jury equivocated over, succumbed to Huddleston’s pressure and abdicated their role. The term “precision” has no application in these circumstances and its use demonstrates that the court is parading the fiction of unanimity.

Addressing the defence of necessity Lord Justice Coleridge stated that:

[T]he real question in the case [is] whether killing under the circumstances set forth in the verdict be or not be murder. The contention that it could be anything else was, to the minds of us all, both new and strange, and we stopped the Attorney General in his negative argument in order that we might hear what could be said in support of a proposition which appeared to us to be at once dangerous, immoral, and opposed to all legal principle and analogy …

A central feature of the show trial is that it is not enough to balance competing viewpoints, the impugned approach must be treated as being unsupportable, inconceivable, almost madness. In using such an extreme phraseology as “new and strangeat once dangerous, immoral, and opposed to all legal principle and analogy” Lord Coleridge again presents a fiction, as the doctrine was neither new, nor strange to English law. Lord Coleridge and all of the august members of the Queen’s Bench were familiar with Bacon’s Maxims and knew that Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England enunciated two principles capable of supporting the doctrine of necessity, as set out above. It was a matter of record that Blackstone’s principles had been used extensively to support Dudley and Stephens by their first counsel, Harry Tilly, before the Falmouth magistrates64. The fourth report of the Criminal Law Commissioners had, in their 1839 Digest of Law (Article 39) included a defence of necessity to homicide, as had the Digest to the Seventh Report (1843) by Article 29.

In its determination the Queen’s Bench did refer to St Aquinas, Grotius and Pufendorf, and noted that “the proposition as to the plank … is said to be derived from the canonists”65 but there is no engagement with the dilemma sough to be solved by these legal thinkers. Despite the close analogy to the Plank dilemma, the Court baldly stated that “the temptation to the act which existed here is not what the law ever called necessity”66. This is plainly wrong, whether Aquinas et al were right or not, Dudley & Stephens was a paradigm “plank” situation. The Queen’s bench gave Sir Francis Bacon a pass, saying that if he “meant to lay down a broad proposition … it is certainly not law at the present day”67.

63Ibid 279. 64Op. cit. 78. 65Dudley & Stephens [8]. 66Op. cit. 286. 67Dudley & Stephens [6].

Because the drawing of lots had been deemed blasphemous by Baron Huddleston and so excised from the trial, the Queen’s Bench could then ignore the rule it provides in extremis, Lord Coleridge stating;

It is not needful to point out the awful danger of admitting the principle which has been contended for. Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or what?

In regard to the facts before it the Queen’s Bench held the act “… was clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by some well recognised excuse”68, confusing the distinct legal categories of justification and excuse. Inconsistency and confusion do not trouble show trials as they are not meant to be rationally analysed but taken as absolute truth.

A signal feature of Dudley & Stephens is the lack of consideration of precedent. McGrowthers case69 a case involving the defence of compulsion in relation to a charge of treason, was not considered although arguably relevant in that Lee CJ had held:

“The only force that doth excuse, is … present fear of death; and his fear must continue all the time the party remains with the rebels”70.

Of general application but glossed over by the Queen’s Bench was Strattons

Case71, in which Lord Mansfield held:

Necessity forcing man to do an act justifies him, because no man can be guilty of a crime without the will and intent in his mind. When a man is absolutely, by natural necessity, forced, his will does not go along with the act.

Customary law was not even mentioned. Show trials are typified by the absolute denial of alternative authority, to the point of them being rendered invisible.

The Court placed its reliance on Lord Holt as set out above and as follows:

But, further still, Lord Hale in the following chapter deals with the position asserted by the casuists, and sanctioned, as he says, by Grotius and Pufendorf, that in a case of extreme necessity, either of hunger or clothing; “theft is no theft, or at least not punishable as theft, as some even of our own lawyers have asserted the same”. “But”, says Lord Hale, “I take it that here in England, that rule, at least by the laws of England, is false; and therefore, if a person, being under necessity for want of victuals or clothes, shall upon that account clandestinely and animo furandi steal another man’s goods, it is felony, and a crime by the laws of England punishable with death” (Hale, Pleas of the Crown, i. 54.).

68Ibid 7. 69How. St. Tr 391:141 70Ibid 142. 7121 How. St. Tr. (Eng.) 1046-1223. 72Ibid.

If, therefore, Lord Hale is clear—as he is—that extreme necessity of hunger does not justify larceny, what would he have said to the doctrine that it justified murder72?

This is sleight of hand. It can be seen that neither of Hales’ examples actually address the facts in Dudley & Stephens, which approximate the plank dilemma and engaged the question; should one be sacrificed for the many? Such a scenario does not figure in either of Hale’s examples and no attempt was made by the Queen’s Bench to analogise between the facts before them and those which formed the basis of Hale’s approach. Further Hales’ view in regard to stealing to live, is itself hyperbole, animos furundi means intention to steal. In addition, it is important that Hale’s comments are in regard to felony, not larceny, which is the crime Grotius and Pufendorf address. The distinction is relevant as the difference between felony and larceny is significant in the weighing of benefit/dis-benefit.

Most importantly there is a signal distinction between the facts in Dudley & Stephens and Hales example as the mens rea elements of the crimes differ, intentional conduct for felony versus malice for murder. The key here is that unlike in Holmes, were the charge was one of unlawful homicide, to unleash the awful power of the Court in a show trial; the Queen’s Bench had to be wielding a capital offence.

In the initial defence of Dudley and Stephens, before the magistrates, Tilly, the lawyer then acting, had drawn heavily on a leading Utilitarian, Sir James Stephens, one of the current Criminal Law commissioners, and author of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, which addressed the doctrine of necessity in terms of the Utilitarian “felicitous calculous”. At the time Utilitarianism was at its height and the “felicitous calculous” provided a rationale opposed to the ideology being advanced by the Queen’s Bench. Not only was this threat negated but Sir Stephens was enlisted to counter United States v Holmes, the most significant obstacle to the Queen’s Bench’s judicial authority, by Lord Coleridge, as follows:

… in which it was decided, correctly indeed, that sailors had no right to throw passengers overboard to save themselves, but on the somewhat strange ground that the proper mode of determining who was to be sacrificed was to vote upon the subject by ballot, can hardly,as my Brother Stephens says, be an authority satisfactory to a court in this country73.

73Dudley & Stephens 8. 74Op cit 248.

Despite the Queens Bench ruling running directly counter to the Utilitarian “felicitous calculous”, its foremost advocate, Sir James Stephen’s made no comment on the case. It is inconceivable that Lord Coleridge would have referred to Sir Stephens as he did without knowing that Stephens’ loyalty to the establishment meant that the Queen’s Bench could deal with the utilitarian argument without any criticism from that direction. Comfortable in having co-opted Sir Stephens, the Queen’s Bench went so far as to explicitly reject a Utilitarian approach to the issue. In his postscript to the case, Mr Justice Grove made a direct counter to the utilitarian rationale, positing the argument that if the men had not been soon rescued and had continued the process of drawing lots one would reach a point where perhaps three had died so that one might live, saying this would be the reverse of utility. Despite the obvious flaw to this reasoning, no public rejoinder was made by Sir Stephens. Simpson says that after the Judgment Sir Stephens let it be known he entirely agreed with the decision, “least any crack in the judicial fabric weaken the authority of the decision”74.

10. The Great Example

Against the pragmatism of the Court in Holmes the Queen’s Bench ultimately denied the defence of necessity on the authority of the “Great Example whom we all profess to follow”75 (emphasis added). In one foul swoop Lord Coleridge converts the entire nation, everyone with a duty to sacrifice themselves. Strangely this duty does not appear to be a well-known part of Christ’s message, as Lord Coleridge is unable to cite a single parable to support it.

As the Queen’s Bench had already purported to find legal authority in Lord Hale the higher authority of Christ was not necessary to determine the case but this was not what was happening. In a show trial the facts, or some semblance of them, are just the framework for the pronouncement of establishment ideology. This the Queen’s Bench did as follows:

… The temptation to the act which existed here was not what the law has ever called necessity. Nor is this to be regretted. Though law and morality are not the same, and many things may be immoral which are not necessarily illegal, yet the absolute divorce of law from morality would be of fatal consequence; and such divorce would follow if the temptation to murder in this case were to be held by law an absolute defence of it. It is not so. To preserve one’s life is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest and the highest duty to sacrifice it. War is full of instances in which it is a man’s duty not to live, but to die. The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a captain to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, of soldiers to women and children, as in the noble case of the Birkenhead; these duties impose on men the moral necessity, not of the preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for others76.

Unpacking this statement, it begins with an untruth. The Dudley & Stephens situation was a paradigm “plank dilemma”. Hecaton, Roman law, Aquinas, Bacon and Blackstone rightly or wrongly argued the defence of necessity applied in these circumstances. There was no precedent for a murder conviction in Customary law and Admiralty law held no wrong had been committed in such circumstances.

The Court then makes claim that allowing the defence to operate would result in an “absolute divorce of law from morality … of fatal consequence” presumably implying consequences fatal not only to cabin boys but to society at large. This is simply theatrical hype, or did the Queen’s Bench really think that society was in danger of being dissolved in a cannibal feast? It should be noted that the operation of necessity as an absolute defence was of their own making, as there had always been the option of laying charges of manslaughter, as in Holmes.

75Ibid. 76Ibid. 77Sir Edward Coke.

The identification of law and morality in this passage is reinforced at the conclusion with the Queen’s Bench founding the duty of self- sacrifice on “moral necessity”. As such the Dudley & Stephens represents the abject surrender of the law’s great project, the “perfection of reason”77. The reason the great jurists eschewed morality in law was because morals differ whereas reason is universal. That the leading judges of their time were unable to found their decision on legal thinking was not suprising as they had cut themselves of from rationality and precedent.

The Queen’s Bench then sets out a muddle of arguments. First it claims that preserving “one’s life is generally speaking a duty” without any basis for this assertion. This claim is then contradicted by the claim that “it may be the plainest and the highest duty to sacrifice it”. This assertion is then supported by the claim that “war is full of instances in which it is a man’s duty not to live”. This overstates the fact. Certainly soldiers have a duty to put themselves in situations where they may not live, but this is not a “duty not to live”, in fact their duty is to outlive the other side. Especially hazardous roles, such as assault troops generally volunteer, as the survivors are promoted. In western culture suicide missions are invariably by volunteers.

The duty, “in case of shipwreck, of a captain to his crew”, is the flip side of the dictatorial powers of a sea captain, with power comes responsibility. Importantly this duty is co-incidental to a captain’s duty to the ship owner and underwriters. An abandoned ship is subject to salvage without negotiation.

The Queen’s Bench baldly states that a crew has a duty to passengers, without any reference to authority or precedent. In Holmes the Court stated that the crew had a duty to the passengers, as common carriers, but in extremis all had the same right bar an exception made to those needed to pilot the lifeboat.

There is no duty of soldiers to women and children, as the concept of collateral damage informs us. In the case of the Birkenhead the soldiers were ordered to stand by, it was their duty to obey orders. In any event the women and children at issue were their own wives and children, a material fact not mentioned by the Queen’s Bench.

Any doctrine based on “the great example”, which cannot muster one verse of scripture and leaps straight from the Prince of Peace to a military duty to die for King and Country is an exercise in ideological acrobatics. The religious motif is sustained throughout the Judgment with the repetitive use of the word “temptation” together with such characterisations such as unbridled passion … if not “devilish deeds”78. To use these terms as descriptors of the desperate delirium of dying men is a nonsense. Moreover, in reaching for an ideological basis for the Judgment Lord Coleridge ends up back with Bacon’s defence of necessity of obedience, insofar as he cites the Roman officer quoted in Bacon’s Maxims as saying: Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam, which translates, “it is necessary to serve (the empire) not live”79.

78Ibid 11. 79Ibid.

As such Dudley & Stephens is an ideological amalgam of imperial dictate and orthodox theological authority. The “necessity to serve” is simply submission to overwhelming force. In Dudley & Stephens this power is manifested in the manner of the trial culminating in the death penalty.

The Judgment’s basis in orthodox theological authority surfaces at the outset with Baron Huddleston rejection of the ruling in US v Holmes, validating the casting of lots, on the basis that it “verges on the blasphemous”80. The Bible defines blasphemy in John 10:33 and Mark 2:7 as calling a mere human God or saying a man has the power to forgive sins. It can be seen there is not a great fit here. At best the casting of lots determines an outcome by chance, which can be viewed as an appeal to fate. It appears then that Huddleston is either using the term “blasphemous” as theatre or is saying that the casting of lots absolves sin, which is to conflate morality with law (It is noted that the pragmatic Justice in Holmes resolved this complex theological problem by simply equating fate with Providence, a stance which the Scholastics might quibble at but which arrives at a practical solution).

Contrary to what appears to be Huddleston’s view it is not Christ’s message that fate is the hand of God. Christ’s message is to choose salvation and as such is based on free will. Free will cannot exist in a world ordered by fate or God. A Christian prays for forgiveness, for strength of faith etc. not to change the world. Christ’s defeat of fate, by rising from the dead, stems from his act of free will, his choice to be crucified. It follows that the casting of lots, as an appeal to fate not God, would only be blasphemous if God was fate. God as fate is not the Christian God, but the jealous God of the Old Testament. It is this priestly religion, the religion of rules, that the court masquerades as Christianity.

Throughout the judgement Lord Coleridge utilises the word temptation, which is a Christian concept, but to characterise Dudley and Stephens’ action as succumbing to temptation misrepresents temptation, at least as a Christian concept. In Christian theology the classic example of temptation is Satan’s attempt to tempt Jesus. This occurs when Jesus is fasting in the desert, so there is some parallel to Dudley and Stephens’ situation, although of course there is a primary distinction in that Jesus chose to fast, Dudley and Stephens did not. Jesus could leave the desert, there was no way out in the Dudley and Stephens’ situation. Satan does not offer Jesus a donut, or perhaps more relevantly someone’s body to fed off. Jesus is offered power over the world. The point is that it is an offer unrelated to Jesus’s survival, he is fasting not starving. Jesus can and does refuse Satan’s offer, he does not chose evil. As a Christian concept temptation only exists where there is a choice, to do good or to do evil. In the Dudley & Stephens situation there is only the Blackstonian choice between two evils, them all dying or one being sacrificed, so they others may live, possibly in time to be rescued. Lord Coleridge does not use the word “temptation” with any accuracy, its use is merely as a moralistic pejorative.

80Op cit 201.

The reason the Queen’s Bench did not engage with Blackstone’s choice between evils principle, is because this was a show trial and any consideration of whether on the facts of the matter Dudley and Stephens were in the grip of the “unavoidable force of compulsion” admits of its possibility. In a show trial the very possibility of another result is denied. More fundamentally, the Queen’s Bench could not engage with Blackstone’s second principle as this brings into play the customary law of the sea.

Going back to the beginning, be that Jonah’s travels or the appalling losses at sea at the time, life for a seaman was tough. Shipwrecks were not uncommon, crews and passengers were reduced to cannibalism and in extremis lots were cast to see who would be sacrificed for the others. There was precedent in the Francis Spaight for sacrificing of those without dependants, such as cabin boys. Dudley references this at the time, saying that Stephens and he had wives and families’ dependent upon them. This is part of the calculous. The wives and children of mariners lost at sea in 1884 may no longer have starved on the streets as they would have 50 years before but their future would be in the horrors of the poor house. This was a reality that the gentlemen of the Queen’s Bench would never know. Rather than engage with such practical solutions to thorny problems on a principled basis, the Queen’s Bench misrepresented the motives at issue. This was not a case of temptation or unbridled passion. and Stephens did not indulge in an act of gluttony.

11. Conclusion

Dudley & Stephens was the leading English authority on the common law doctrine of necessity for about 100 years. As late as 1962 Brett & Waller, in their ‘Cases & Materials in Criminal Law’, described the case in these terms:

 “The jurors, being men of great sagacity found all these facts by way of a special verdict. They declined to give their view whether these facts amounted to murder and instead prayed the advice of the court (Huddleston B) being likewise a man of great sagacity; the court reserved the question for argument before a court of five judges of the Queen’s Bench division”.

Despite Brett & Waller’s heaping of sagacity upon sagacity on the Queen’s Bench, Dudley & Stephens was entirely disregarded at Nuremburg. In the Krupp Trial the Tribunal referred to the fact scenario in Holmes and cited Strattons Case in its adoption of “the Anglo-American rule” as follows:

“Necessity is a defence when it is shown that the act charged was done to avoid an evil severe and irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and that the remedy was not disproportioned to the evil”81.

81US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Judgment of 31 July 1948 Vol. IX p 90.

It was not until George Fletchers’ Rethinking Criminal Law, published in 1984, that the thinking behind Dudley & Stephens was really questioned. This raises the issue that in Dudley & Stephens the highest Court in England had ceased to be a court that applied reason and instead had become the vehicle for proclaiming moral standards. Worse still the muddled morality of the Court was proclaimed by leading elements of the legal profession, such as Brett & Waller, to be the pinnacle of wisdom. In essence this was a collapse of one of the most fundamental pillars of the English legal system, the separation of church and state. The separation of church and state is the basis of an independent Court, as when this is so, the law is not bent towards policing moral or ideological precepts. It is then free to apply practical wisdom to the difficult legal problems that arise.

It has been argued that what fundamentally differentiates humans is that we are a rule making species. The lot provided a rule for extreme situations, which was a step above the law of the jungle. Aquinas removed the validating mechanism of the lot from the Roman defence of necessity, because it clashed with his religious beliefs but this deprived it of a principled foundation. Such was Aquinas’ authority that subsequent common law jurists, of the stature of Bacon and Blackstone, accepted his truncated version of the defence, without question. The Queen Bench’s was right to be concerned that the defence, as adopted from Aquinas, could be a “legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime” but this was a concern which arose from the Court’s denial of customary law, which retained the mechanism of the lot.

The central flaw in Dudley & Stephens arose from Baron Huddleston’s lying to the jury that as a matter of law there was no justification, when the legal authority for such a proposition was the one he was involved in contriving. This misrepresentation led to the special verdict which took from the jury its right to determine the facts. The Queen’s Bench in its critique of the utilitarian calculation asked: “[w]ho is the judge of this sort of [brute] necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured”82. The reason the Court has to ask itself these questions is because they had ousted the usual means by which questions of fact are answered. It is the jury, the representatives of society, who were the rightful judge

of these questions. The first question asks: when does a state of necessity exist? This is a question of fact and queries as whether on the facts there was no choice or only the Blackstonian choice of evils, not being able to be negated beyond reasonable doubt. The answer to this question is both factual and normative. That is, what were the material facts and what does society expect from its members in such a fact situation. As set out above, the Jury found that “they would have died if they had not had his [Richard Parker’s] body to feed off”. This was a finding of fact that there was a state of necessity. Into this statement Baron Huddleston interjected the word “probably”, falsifying the record.

82Ibid.

The second question relates to the choice of Richard Parker, the cabin boy. There are two factors here, firstly Dudley’s evidence that Parker would have died first and secondly the customary practice of lots being drawn between cabin boys, on the basis that they had no families to support. Here the Jury found: “Richard Parker was likely to die first”. Although much was made by the Queen’s Bench of the word “likely”, findings at law are not required to be absolute, that is an impossibly high standard. The word “likely” in context means that the prosecution could not negate the evidence, that Parker was dying and would have died first, beyond reasonable doubt. With this finding there is no need for the Queen’s Bench’s second question, as the Jury found that the selection process was based on who was “likely to die first” rather than the cabin boy option. Hard cases make bad law, properly the Court never seeks to answer a question which is not required of it.

A legal code is meant to be instructive of conduct and in the operation of defences it instructs in regard to positive action. The casting of lots provided a mechanism for resolving a dire situation. A core problem with Dudley & Stephens is that it does not provide a clear guide.

The first order of failure is that it provides two antithetical value systems, one purportedly Christian and the other martial, but gives no means of discerning which is appropriate in what circumstance. The second order of failure is that each value system has its own set of problems. Within the “Christian” value-set there is no mechanism for determining upon whom the supreme unction of sacrifice is to be bestowed upon. Do we all rush for the razor blades? What happens if two of us get there at the same time?

The martial value-set also has problems. Outside of the military ranks there is no bona fide authority for the giving and taking of such orders. Even within the military ranks there is no formal obligation for the specific sacrifice of military for civilians. As discussed above the case of the Birkenhead was a false analogy. The Queen’s Bench appeared to endorse Holmes, in that it held that in extremis there is an obligation on a Captain to the crew, which arises from the responsibility that comes with the broad powers invested in a ship’s Captain. However, transferred to a military context this runs against the norm that martial duties generally operate the other way round, inferiors owe duties to superiors. Such a position, that martial duties are owed by inferiors to superiors conforms with Lord Coleridge’s advocacy of a defence of necessity when obedience to the empire is in issue, insofar as he endorsed the Roman maxim that it is “necessary to serve, not to live”, discussed above. As noted above a necessity to serve, or the defence of following orders, was not an approach that found favour at Nuremburg.

References

Regina v Dudley & Stephens Law Reports 1884-85 Queen’s Bench Division Vol. XIV 273, Version Referred to Here Justis—ICLR Special Issue

Bacon, F. (1639). The Elements of the Common Lawes of England. London

Blackstone, W. (2002). Commentaries on the Laws of England. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Brett & Waller (1962) Cases & Materials in Criminal Law. Melbourne: Butterworths.

Ghanayam, K. (2006). Excused Necessity in Western Legal Philosophy. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 19, 31-32. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900005592

Grotius, H. (1625) The Rights of War and Peace, Including the Law of Nature and of Nations. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.

Hale, M. (1765) Historia Placitorum Coronæ: The History of the Pleas of the Crown Vol. 1.

Hecaton, Moral Duties in Cicero, DE OFFICUS bk. III xxiii (Trans Walter Miller, Harvard University Press 1913, rpt 1975).

Krupp Trial US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Judgment of 31 July 1948 Vol. IX p 90.

Pufendorf (1672) The Law of Nature and Nations. Oxford.

Simpson, A. W. B. (1986). Cannibalism and the Common Law. London: Penguin.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part II, 1st Part, que. 96, art 6. See also II, II, que. 110 art.1.

US v Holmes (1842). 1 Wallace Junior 1, 26 Fed. Cas 360.

Bibliography

Moral Duties in Cicero Hecaton, DE OFFICUS bk. III xxiii (Trans Walter Miller, Harvard University Press 1913, rpt 1975).

Summa Theologica St. Thomas Aquinas (1485).

The Elements of the Common Lawes of England Francis Bacon (1630).

Arnold, Symbols of Government New Haven: Yale University Press 1934.

Historia Placitorum Coronæ; The History of the Pleas of the Crown, by Sir Matthew Hale, Knight, sometime Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, edited by Sollom Emlyn (London, (1736)).

Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone (2002). Commentaries on the Laws of England. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Factual background to Dudley & Stephens and customary law of the time.

Cannibalism and the Common Law AWB Simpson Penguin 1986.

Modern expositions on the defense, particularly those most influential or expressly referred to in this paper.

The Case of the Speluncean Explorers Lon L. Fuller Harvard Law Review 1949.

Rethinking Criminal Law’ George Fletcher Oxford University Press, 2000.

Two Men and a Plank C Finkelstein. Legal Theory 7 (2001) 279-306.

Excused Necessity in Western Legal Philosophy K Ghanayam 19 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 31 2006.