Amongst the rash of finger pointing following the withdrawal of NATO+ forces from Afghanistan, there has been references to various “prescient” US intelligence analyses, the conclusions generally being drawn that the upper echelons simply ignored them. It may not be that simple.
There are fascinating aspects of the Politburo Minutes from the time of the Soviet engagement. One is the dramatic changes of opinion rapidly sweeping through the Soviet leadership. In the Minute of 17 March 1979 there is a clear consensus. Gromyko states: “under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan.” Andropov reiterates this. Kosygin says, “All of us agree – we must not surrender Afghanistan.” They agree to provision of bread and paying more for Afghani gas. They put in place a rapid army deployment plan and send in specialist military advisors. Kosygin is to speak to the Afghan leader, Taraki and evaluate.
The next day, 18 March 1978, the meeting begins with Kosygin updating following his discussion with Taraki. The news is bleak. Afghani troops are fraternising with the insurgents in Herat and Taraki’s advice is that “If Herat falls, then it is considered that the matter is finished”. There are no troops that could be sent in and they have no tank crews. Taraki has a hair- brained idea that the Russians can send in Tadhzik tank crews in Afghan uniforms, which Kosygin shoots down as sure to be “immediately uncovered” and “broadcast to the whole world”. Kosygin then relates: “Almost without realizing it, Comrade Taraki responded that almost nobody does support the government.” Andropov then characterises the Afghan situation as not ready for socialism and says: “we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, and for us that is entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a risk.” Later he says… “the people do not support the government of Taraki. Would our troops really help them here? In such a situation, tanks and armoured cars can’t save anything. Gromyko completely supports Andropov, saying “our army … will be the aggressor” and will have to fight the Afghan people. He opines such a move would be against international law and would wreck détente, for little gain. Kosygin says “we cannot deploy troops, since they would be fighting…. against the people.” Brezhnev was not present at either of the above meetings but was present on 19 March 1978, when he summarized and agreed with the 18 May consensus but also with the 17 May consensus to the extent of supplying aid and preparing for contingencies.
The declassified CIA intelligence report, The Politburo and Soviet Decision-Making’, written in regard to the Brezhnev era, states that it “seeks to dispel some of the aura of mystery which traditionally shrouded Kremlin decision making”. As an overview it says:
The picture which emerges is of decision-makers who are neither infallible giants nor glorified clerks, but hard-driving, able politicians whose ambitions and diverse responsibilities tend to create cross-purposes: in short, human actors within a highly tensioned, but strong and flexible, political system”.
I am sure this is correct. However, despite the 18 March consensus, that “in such a situation, tanks and armoured cars can’t save anything” the Politburo returned to the 17 March position, that they could not “lose Afghanistan” and invaded. This is despite being fully appraised of the two core problems for them, the religious dimension and the involvement of not only local actors, Iran and Pakistan, but also the US and China. Hindsight is 20/20, but history shows that not only was the 18 March consensus correct, but that the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan was a signal factor in the collapse of the Soviet system. In regard to the collapse, Gorbachev was an attendee at these meetings, but as he was then a junior, no comments by him, if any, where recorded.
The answer is empire and the military’s central role in empire. In the Minutes of the above Politburo meetings, Minister of Defence D F Ustinov, bearing in mind the CIA characterization of “ambitions and diverse responsibilities,” plays an adroit role. On 17 March he does not engage in the political discourse, either for or against. He advises of the perilous situation in Herat and the Afghani request for military assistance. He suggests they waive payment for arms being supplied and urges urgency. He has well laid contingency plans for rapid deployment but firmly resists the idea he should go to Afghanistan, for negotiations. On 18 March 1979, he did not contradict those who are vocal in their realisation that a war could not be won, but quietly got agreement that the army should continue with its contingency operations.
Since Stalin, control of the armed forces was always held by the Chairman of the Politburo, but Brezhnev was a very sick man by 1980 and died in mid-1982. This meant that there was no real civilian control over the army at the time the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. While the war was pitched as the defence of international socialism, in reality it was fought for military interests, to safeguard the southern border of the USSR.
Looking at the NATO + involvement in the same terms, there are many parallels. Ostensibly, the invasion was to protect the international order and combat terror, when in fact it was to take advantage of the very strategic weakness the Soviet’s intervention had engendered in the Russian sphere.
We know, from the above Politburo Minutes, that the Soviet leadership was aware of the pitfalls well before the invasion. It could not be argued that the CIA’s characterization of the Soviet rulers could not also apply to the Western rulers. How could such “able politicians” who not only had the Soviet example, but very good intelligence, continue to stumble down the very same track.
The answer again must be empire. The killing of the Kennedys, was not so much assassination as a coup d’état by the MIC. Since then there has not been a President who has dared to challenge this power and those who have threatened to, like Carter or Trump, only lasted one term. The driving force behind the invasion was the military and the war profiteers. As WikiLeaks recently commented, profits from the war industries increased 10 fold over the period of the Afghan occupation. It remains to be seen if “the graveyard of empires” claims this skull as well, but it not looking good for them. Rather than encircle Russia and outflank China, an Islamic heartland has been created, which links resources with Chinese industry, under the Russian military umbrella. It is looking like the wheels are falling off the “American” Century already.
The Daily Lama 