Introduction
The Zimmermann Telegram was a telegram which in January 1917 was sent by the German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann, to the German ambassador in Mexico. As set out below the telegram offered German financial support for a Mexican attack on the United States of America, to regain its lost territories. Also referred to is the possible involvement of the Japanese.
This affair has been the subject of two books, Barbara Tuchman’s, The Zimmermann Telegram published in 1959 and Thomas Bogart’s The Zimmermann telegram: intelligence diplomacy and America’s Entry into World War I published in 2012. The central thesis put forward here is that both these works are ideologically interventionist and that the writer’s political agendas blind them to obvious inconsistencies inherent in the affair. Of the two Tuchman is by far the most crass. In a work hailed at the time as ‘an obeisance to evidence’ by the New York Times she falsifies, by truncation, the telegram itself in order to support her analysis. This outright re-writing of history is but the worst of many distortions that typify a piece of propaganda that is almost Stalinist in its crudity but which is still today recommended reading and described as a ‘classic’.
Bogart’s work is far less blatant and appears to be more of a work of history than a polemic. Bogart’s militarist, rather than liberal, interventionism position blinds him to the obvious inconsistencies inherent in the affair and particularly to the possibility that the telegram was not deciphered, in a triumph of illegal surveillance as is officially claimed, but was always intended to be publicised.
Tuchman’s book, the accepted historical account from 1959 to 2012, is oblivious to the fact that it was impossible for the alliance, suggested by Zimmermann in his telegram, to be realised and so does not raise the question: why was the Telegram sent? Despite widespread belief that the telegram was an invention of British propaganda, particularly by the highly influential Hearst press, Zimmermann publicly admitted sending the telegram, and this at a time when American intervention in World War I hung in the balance. This hugely significant facet of an affair, which can only be described as bizarre, that Tuchman utterly fails to engage with. As Tuchman’s work is at such divergence with reality this essay commences with setting out the issues inherent in the affair. In Part 2 it then embarks on a critique of Tuchman’s book and concludes with an analysis of Bogart’s.
The Telegram
On 11 January 1917 the German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann, sent a telegram to the German ambassador in Mexico which stated:
We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal or alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. Please call the President’s attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace.” Signed, ZIMMERMANN[1]
[1] https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=60&page=transcript
Timeline
11 January 1917 Zimmermann telegram sent to German Embassy in Mexico
I February 1917 Germany resumed unrestricted U boat attacks
3 February US breaks of diplomatic ties with Germany
1 March Telegram published in press
3 & 29 March 1917 Zimmermann states publicly that telegram sent by him
9 March US Executive order arming merchant ships
2 April 1917 US Pres Woodrow Wilson seeks congressional support for declaration of war on Germany
6 April 1917 US declares war on Germany
Background – the German military situation
By late 1916 the British blockade was throttling Germany and the poor were beginning to starve. On the Western front the Entente was getting the upper hand, British invention of the tank and Monash’s Australian troops’ tactics gaining ground in the trenches. To have any hope of a negotiated peace, let alone victory it was crucial for the Germans that the Americans were kept out of the conflict, which conversely the British were doing everything they could to achieve.
The prime strategic consideration of keeping America from siding with Britain was directly at odds with the prime strategic objective of counter blockading Britain by means of the U-boat. The U-boat blockade, entailing attacks on American shipping and American civilian casualties, was highly controversial and a rich source of British propaganda against the Germans. When the Americans had threatened that this issue could bring them into the war, after the sinking of the Lusitania, Germany had limited its U-boat campaign. By late 1916 Germany’s ability to wage war was so reduced that unlimited attacks on shipping was seen by the German military as the only way to knock Britain out of the war and so prevent defeat.
Analysis
The telegram begins with informing that Germany intends unrestricted submarine warfare as of 1 February 1917. It says Germany will endeavour to keep the US neutral but in the event that this is not successful it proposes a military alliance by which Germany will provide “generous financial support” on the basis that Mexico “is to reconquer their lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona”, “settlement in detail” being left to Mexico.
The question must be what financial support could the Germans have offered which would enabled Mexico to defeat America and take back these territories. To be able to do so Germany, with its armies bogged down in a stalemate on the Western Front and grinding away on the Eastern Front, blockaded, now chancing desperate moves to avoid defeat, would have to simultaneously provide “financial support” at least equivalent to that of America, the greatest economic power of the time. In addition it is at this time that Zimmerman and the German military were in the process of adopting Israel Helphand’s plan to fund the Russian Bolsheviks, ultimately to the tune of 50 million Gold Marks. The answer must be that there was not the slightest possibility that Germany could have offered financial support to the Mexicans in the magnitude required and that Zimmerman knew this at the time.
On receipt of the telegram the Mexican president Carrenza set up a military commission to consider the offer. One wonders why he didn’t reject it out of hand as being plain crazy but we must be grateful to him as the Commission’s findings are a primary resource of the first order and a welcome expression of common sense in what is otherwise an illogical and incoherent landscape. It should be noted that Tuchman does not reference or cite in any way this core historical document. The Commission of course rejected the alliance on every ground. In regard to the offer of financial support it noted that the Germans had not even been able to provide the gold necessary for the establishment of a Mexican national bank.
The next oddity stated in the telegram is that the above message was to be given to the Mexican president when the German ambassador in Mexico “is certain” that America is about to enter the war against Germany. This is an incredibly heavy responsibility to place on a person in what would not be thought of as being in a top level diplomatic post. So the German ambassador in Mexico was being asked to commit his country to a military alliance against the most powerful nation in the world, when he thought the time was right? This cannot be right and in fact was not what happened, the Telegram was merely passed on directly to the Mexican president on receipt.
The telegram goes on to say to the German ambassador:
“add the suggestion that he [the Mexican President] should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves”
It is Tuchman’s core proposition that the real and substantial threat to America, inherent in the telegram, was the threat from Japan. When looked at closely this is completely illusory. If we take the first line of the above extract it is of course a logical impossibility that the Mexican president could do something on his own initiative, when this is being suggested to him by another. What is being asked is that the Mexican president engage in subterfuge, intended to conceal the fact that Germany is the instigator of this proposed alliance.
In the context that Germany is about to recommence unrestricted U-boat warfare with the very likely result that America will forthwith declare war on Germany, it is not at all clear why this subterfuge is necessary. In regard to Zimmermann’s attitude in a somewhat similar situation, the sinking of the Lusitania Boghardt relates the following exchange between Zimmermann and a journalist in which Zimmermann “remarked cheerfully”:
“Now, this will have quite an effect! The hatred towards us can’t possibly increase, they will always hate us, but in this situation the only thing we can do is lash out at all sides, we have no room for any consideration whatsoever”.[1]
Leaving aside the claim that these words are spoken “cheerfully”, if this is Zimmermann’s attitude at the time of the Lusitania, then why is he not talking directly to the Japanese when according to the Telegram the Japanese are to be invited to immediately enter mediations with Germany, which is clearly the major party. It makes no sense to ask the Mexicans to invite in Japan.
The issue of Japanese involvement raises an enormous problem for the proposition that the telegram was intended for the purpose it claimed and that is the problem of time. The telegram was sent on 11 January 1917. Zimmermann knew that Germany would recommence unrestricted U-boat attacks on 1 February 1917. He knew that as Germany had restricted its attacks on neutral and specifically American shipping because America had threatened to enter the war, that renewal of unrestricted attacks will probably bring America into the war. To prevent this, any attack on America by a third party such as Mexico, should be made before America declared war on Germany. America declared war on 6 April 1917. Realistically then there were about three months in which to launch the attack. If the Japanese have not yet been invited to join this alliance and nor had they previously been engaged in discussions, then there had been no planning or preparation by them and if they were only being invited subsequent to Mexican agreement then not enough time to do so.
The part the Mexicans were called upon to play was to invade America with the intention of retaking of its lost provinces. On their own the only response that the Mexicans could realistically expect from America was for Mexico to go the way of the lost provinces and be wiped off the map. The only way that such a response could possibly be avoided would be for the Mexicans to receive military support on a massive scale, and this just to avoid total defeat, still more would be required to actually achieve the outcomes sought.
To provide such military support Japan would have to do three things. It would have to raise a large army. As the Americans raised a force of approximately 2.8 million men for the war in Europe and as it could not be argued that the Americans would expend less effort defending their own soil, the force the Japanese would have to have raised would be of the same order. Japan would then have to be ready to transport this enormous military force across the Pacific and be able to supply it. At some point the Japanese would have to destroy the larger American Pacific Fleet. It would then have to be be able to maintain and supply this huge force on continental America and be able to repel counter attack by the American Atlantic Fleet and the British Navy.
This run down does not even consider the difficulties in deploying and forward supplying these forces in an area with limited communications infrastructure. There are immense logistical and planning preparations that are absolutely necessary for any such plan to become a reality, we are talking many months if not years. By comparison America declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917 but it was not until 1918 that the Americans began landing substantial forces in Europe.
Such an undertaking must be contrasted with Japan’s effort in World War II. Then, faced with the existential threat of the American oil embargo, the high point of the Japanese effort vis-a-vis ‘Continental’ America, was to junk some obsolete battleships in Pearl Harbour and provide the Americans with an excuse for going to war with Germany. It is true that the Japanese did manage to extend the scope of their atrocities beyond Korea and China for a while but after the battle of Midway in June 1942 the threat to America was so insubstantial that American forces were concentrated on Europe. Importantly this later period is the dawn of the power of the aircraft carrier and in this development Japan ranked second in the world, behind America. The period at issue is the era of the dreadnought and here the British Navy was pre-eminent.
It is correct that an attack could have been launched after America entered the war, obviating the necessity of prior planning and mobilisation. The difficulty here is the advantage a surprise attack would have had, as isolationist America had a small standing army and some initial success might have been hoped for. Once America declared war it began mobilising its enormous forces, forces large enough to contend with anything that Japan could put in the field, without significantly detracting from the forces it committed to Europe, as it did in World War II.
All this does not even take account of the fact that at this time the Japanese were a British ally and a contingent of their Navy was engaged in the Mediterranean, in action against the Austrian fleet.
A possible interpretation is that the words ‘invite Japan to immediate adherence” conveys that the Japanese were already on board the alliance with Germany and was only awaiting Mexico’s agreement. The proposition of prior Japanese involvement raises a fundamental problem. There is not a single shred of evidence in any archive document, memoir or biography of what would had to have been an enormous amount of military planning and mobilisation on the part of the Japanese. The single most important factor which counts against there being any treaty between Germany and Japan, agreeing to a joint attack on the US, is the absence of any record which indicates that this existed. While it is highly improbable that all records of any such agreement have been lost, it is inconceivable that the Japanese could have engaged in the enormous planning and preparation that an attack on the US would have entailed and there not be a single document left which suggest this. And this after Japan’s unconditional surrender in World War II and American occupation.
The possibility of prior Japanese involvement being discounted one must return to a literal interpretation of the telegram and conclude that at the time the telegram was sent there was no Japanese involvement in Zimmermann’s plan. This interpretation is supported by what is an almost fantastical facet of this affair. Prior to the telegram being sent Zimmermann did not consult or have sanction from the government, the Kaiser, or the military high command. Considering that he was apparently attempting to form a military alliance in time of war this is truly incredible.
It is also important that during the recriminations by German politicians that followed exposure of the telegram, Zimmermann claimed he was merely acting in accordance with the Kaiser’s policy of forming alliances against the Entente. While policy was discussed there was never any mention of any agreement with Japan still less a treaty.
Conclusion
It follows from the above that:
(a) it was not possible for Germany to make good the offer of financial support of the magnitude required;
(b) it is highly unlikely that the timing of the offer would be left to the German ambassador;
(c) the suggestion that Mexico invite Japan to join in this attack on America, admits of two possibilities. First that prior to the telegram the Germans had come to an understanding with the Japanese but wanted Mexico to broach tripartite negotiations, for no obvious reason. It this was the case then to be an actual strategy, immense planning and mobilisation by the Japanese was required. In the absence of any record of such a huge undertaking this possibility can be discounted. Second the Japanese were not already on board but if not then there was simply not enough time to mount the invasion prior to American mobilisation and the prospects of success post American mobilisation were zero.
All the above indicates that it could never have been thought by Zimmerman that the telegram could have accomplished what it purported to. The question then becomes “is this treason or is it stupidity”. Two things point to the former. If one discounts the idea that the telegram intended to put in train a Mexican invasion of America then the only point of the exercise was to threaten the possibility. At best this might have meant the commitment of some US forces to America’s Mexican border. It may have sowed distrust with Japan, which was engaged in an important theatre of the war.
The official story is that the telegram was intercepted by British intelligence, illegally, as it was sent via the US ambassador, all German telegram services having being cut by the Entente powers. As such the interception and decoding is held up as an example of the virtue of illegal military action. The point is that you cannot threaten someone if they are not aware of the threat. Looked at this way the alleged interception must have been intended by Zimmerman, as the only way you can have a secret treaty that becomes public knowledge and hence a threat, is to have it revealed.
This theory is reinforced by the fact that a widespread American reaction to the publication of the telegram was one of incredulity. The perfidious nature of British propaganda was well known and the conflict between reality and assumptions made in the telegram were ridiculed, importantly by the enormously influential Hearst press. Despite ‘plausible deniability’ Zimmermann publicly acknowledged responsibility for the telegram, twice. In doing this he must’ve been conscious that he was contributing to his nation’s military defeat, which the Entente had made clear would only be on unconditional surrender.
On the other hand some folks do really dumb stuff, although such is not generally expected of Foreign Ministers of major powers. It is possible that Zimmerman thought that the Americans could be threatened because he mistakenly conflated isolationism with weakness, which ironically is the position both Tuchman and Boghart take. It is possible that Zimmermann’s gambit reflected the mindset apparently exemplified in the above comments he made on the sinking of the Lusitania but for myself there is a question mark over the accuracy of that quote as I find it very difficult to equate the words used with the claim that they were cheerfully spoken. It may have been that Zimmerman was certain unrestricted U-boat warfare would bring America into the war and thought it didn’t matter what he did. However the Telegram itself says that he will be doing all he can to keep America neutral, which is what one would think was the German Foreign Minister’s job description.
It should be mentioned that in Woodrow Wilson’s speech to Congress seeking that America declare war on Germany, very little mention is made of the Zimmermann telegram and the great bulk of that speech focuses on Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare. However, it could be seen that the effect of the telegram was to attack American isolationism, particularly in Congress, by linking Germany with the spectre of war on American soil.
It appears then that the reason why the Telegram was sent and Zimmermann admitted to sending it, was possibly one of the following:
(a) Zimmermann was an incompetent fool who didn’t know what he was doing;
(b) Zimmermann was an incompetent fool who didn’t know what he was doing, he expected the proposed alliance to be revealed and intended for it to operate as a threat rather than a reality. Quite how he thought this would advance German interests is unclear and we probably return to (a) above;
(c) Zimmermann was an incompetent fool who didn’t know what he was doing. He was manipulated by British intelligence into sending the Telegram and the interception story is a myth. This sounds pretty wacky but the cue bono, or ‘who benefits’ approach is often the right one. Certainly the British were the only ones who benefited from the Zimmermann telegram and that the interception was bogus was a widely held view at the time. There is some foundation. Boghart writes that the idea was not Zimmermann’s own and that Zimmermann was a man who was easily manipulated by lobbyists. Unfortunately Boghart’s does not or could not drill deep enough and we do not learn who these lobbyists were. What cuts against this theory is Zimmermann’s public acceptance he sent the telegram, as it is hard to see him as being that stupid.
(d) Zimmermann was a traitor. He was part of a British plot to undermine American isolationism and bring America into the war against Germany. He sent the telegram knowing it would be revealed and antagonise America. He admitted responsibility for it so as to hasten American involvement in the war and the defeat of Germany.
[1] Zimmermann telegram: intelligence diplomacy and America’s entry into World War I p31
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